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American higher education has been affected by spiraling cost, 
declining college-age population, decreasing financial aid and defense 
grants, budget reductions from state governments and concerns about 
quality. The merging of two or more institutions into a single entity is 
one strategy to cope with these changes. The literature on the subject 
of merger, however, is fragmented and dwells mainly on the reasons 
why institutions merge. This study examines the tensions and 
elements that constitute the merger phenomenon in its totality and 
identifies implications for implementation. 
The study analyzed 18 doctoral dissertation case studies of 20 
higher educational mergers that took place during the period 1964- 
1985. Similarities and differences were identified and the findings 
compared with the merger literature. The data were then interpreted 
from the perspective of organizational change. 
The analysis indicated that three major tensions shape the merger 
phenomenon: the clash between maintaining the status quo and 
implementing change; the emergence of one institution as the 
v 
dominant party thereby exacerbating the change for the subordinate 
party; and the accomplishment of organizational objectives at the 
expense of individual needs. A pattern emerged indicating that 
change was not managed, decision-making was top down and self- 
centered, crisis was not anticipated, power was used to dominate, 
conflict was divisive, planning was non-existent or poorly done and 
implementation was characterized by limited strategies to facilitate 
the process. 
Several important distinctions were identified according to the 
type of control of the merging institutions. Differences were found in 
the impelling reasons, motivation, process stages, type of risk, degree 
of consultation and outcomes. Exceptions to the conventional wisdom 
that financially troubled institutions should not merge were noted. 
Also, a simple legal maneuver frequently employed in the corporate 
world was identified as an alternative to the standard merger 
approach. 
In order to facilitate the complex process of a merger and to 
address the identified problems, the application of the integrated 
frames approach for managing organizational change as developed by 
Bolman and Deal [1984] is recommended. Strategic planning is also 
recommended as an effective tool for coping with change. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the goals of higher education is to produce change in 
people and the society in which they function. Institutions of higher 
education themselves are in turn subject to change. They exist in a 
dynamic environment in which political, economic, social and religious 
factors have traditionally changed their goals, programs and structure. 
As a result of these factors, many American institutions of higher 
education have either closed or merged since the founding of the first 
college. 1 At the current time, declining college-age population, 
spiraling cost, decreases in financial aid and defense grants, and 
revenue short falls for state governments are some of the factors that 
affect colleges and universities. The merging of two or more 
institutions into a single entity is one strategy to cope with these 
changes. This leads to the two-fold fundamental question of this 
study: What are the dynamic tensions and elements that constitute 
the merger phenomenon in higher education and what are their 
implications for implementing a merger? In answering this question, 
I found that change itself produces basic tensions that shape and 
influence the merger phenomenon. 
I did not start this study with an understanding of the importance 
of change in the merger phenomenon. It evolved during the course of 
the study. At the outset, it was my sense that the mergers of 
institutions of higher education involved problems with their 
implementation and aftermath. I based this on my personal 
experience as both a participant and observer of three separate 
mergers in higher education.2 As the study evolved, it became 
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apparent that a merger was frequently viewed by policy makers and 
administrators as an event and not as a complex process involving 
significant change. Change manifested itself in the three major 
tensions identified in the study that shape the merger phenomenon: 
(a) the clash between maintaining the status quo and implementing 
change; (b) the emergence of one institution as the dominant party 
thereby exacerbating the change for the subordinate party; and (c) the 
accomplishment of organizational objectives at the expense of 
individual needs in a situation involving change. The apparent lack of 
understanding of these tensions and the dynamics of change is a 
contributing factor to the problems associated with the 
implementation of the merger process. This study substantiates the 
contention of Bugliarello and Urrows [1976] that the lack of 
information about the merger of institutions of higher education is 
aggravated by the myth that they are easy to carry out. 
It is important to know how this study evolved. Based on my 
initial observations that there are problems associated with merging 
institutions and a desire to find out if it could be done better, I decided 
to investigate the subject further. In turning to the literature to learn 
more about the merger of colleges and universities, I found 
fragmentation and a degree of incompleteness.^ There is only one 
comprehensive study on the subject. This is an analysis of 10 mergers 
conducted by John Millet [1976]. The rest of the literature is 
concentrated mainly in the area of describing the reasons why 
institutions merged. How institutions implemented a merger and the 
resulting outcomes were dealt with to a much lesser extent. The 
literature gave me some direction, but lacked the depth and scope to 
3 
provide a complete understanding of the merger phenomenon. In 
support of this conclusion. Chambers [1981a] maintains that there is 
little knowledge presented in the literature on how institutions should 
merge. Others have concluded that the mergers in higher education 
have attracted little attention in the literature in comparison to the 
mergers that take place in the business world [Bugliarello and Urrows, 
1976]. 
To learn more about specific mergers, I next turned to a search of 
the Dissertation Abstracts International to locate case studies. This 
search yielded a total of 18 dissertation case studies written between 
1974 and 1990 on 20 separate mergers. To my surprise, these studies 
had not been synthesized nor referenced in the literature. At this 
point in my investigation, I felt that I had discovered an untapped 
source of data concerning the merger phenomenon. I felt excitement 
at the prospect of examining the thick description of the case studies 
for new information. Would the results of my exploration reinforce, 
contradict, expand or further explain the current literature? I decided 
at this point that it would be of greater value to analyze and compare 
these case studies rather than conduct yet another case study on an 
individual merger. 
Having completed the review of literature in the standard 
manner, the next question became how to proceed with the analysis of 
the case studies. The full-text microfiche copies of these dissertations 
were first purchased from University Microfilms International. The 
list of dissertations is contained in Appendix A. The mergers analyzed 
by the dissertation case studies are listed in Appendix B. Each case 
study was then analyzed in-depth and systematically by using the 
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constant comparative methodology of Lincoln and Guba [1985]. I did 
not formulate any a priori hypotheses. As I read each dissertation, 
points and factors that were deemed to be important were placed 
under the broad category to which it pertained: reasons, process or 
outcome. These points and findings in each major category were then 
analyzed across the studies. This resulted in the emergence of various 
subcategories from the data. The subcategories were then evaluated 
which led to the formulation of various themes. According to Patton 
[1980], case studies can be compared and contrasted in this manner to 
identify similarities, differences and idiosyncrasies.4 
Now that I had all these data grouped into categories and various 
themes, I was prepared to compare them to the conventional wisdom 
derived from the review of literature. Through this comparison, I 
found areas where the case studies substantiated and differed with 
the literature. There were also areas where data from the case studies 
further delineated or explained various statements and suppositions 
contained in the literature. 
Having completed this stage of the research, the study still lacked 
a frame within which I could understand the merger phenomenon in 
its totality. I knew how the mergers described in the case studies 
related to each other and how they compared with the current 
literature, but something was missing. Stepping back from the details 
of the data, I dwelled on two fundamental characteristics of the 
merger phenomenon: change and its organizational impact. To find 
out more about these two characteristics, I decided to reread Modern 
Approaches to Understanding and Managing Organizations by Bolman 
and Deal [1984]. This led me to the conclusion that this work could 
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provide a useful frame to interpret the data. This perspective applied 
to the mass of data generated by the multi-case study analysis and its 
subsequent comparison to the literature provided a framework for me 
to discern tensions, differences and patterns in the data. This in turn 
led to an understanding of what was happening and why it was 
happening in a merger situation within the context of organizational 
change. The tensions between forces for change and the status quo 
and the reaction of groups and individuals to change were identified. 
The work of Bolman and Deal [1984] not only assisted me in 
understanding the totality of the merger phenomenon, but it also 
provided the foundation for developing recommendations on how 
policy makers and implementors can facilitate the merger process. 
They maintain that various theories of organization can be grouped 
under four major categories: rational, human resource, political and 
symbolic. These groupings of the major schools of thought according to 
coherent perspectives of reality are called frames.^ Bolman and Deal 
posit that to understand the complexity of an organization, one should 
view it through the perspective of the four frames. In order for an 
organization to be managed successfully, managers must "rely 
intuitively on the different frames, blending them into a coherent, 
pragmatic, personal theory of organizations" [p. 6]. By integrating the 
frames, managers can respond to change by striving to attain an 
alignment within the organization, that is, the matching of structure, 
people, politics and symbols to one another so that they are mutually 
supporting. 
It is appropriate to interpret the merger phenomenon within an 
organizational change context because an institution involved in a 
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merger is an organization that is undergoing alterations in its 
structure, procedures and rituals. The use of power and the allocation 
of resources are very much a part of the merger process. Individuals 
within the organization—trustees, faculty, staff, students and 
alumni—are affected in various ways by a merger. There often exists 
a tension between organizational ends and individual needs. By 
focusing on the change aspects of the merger phenomenon, insights 
and understanding can be generated by interpreting the case study 
findings in a broader and congruent context. 
The purpose then of this study has evolved into one that seeks an 
understanding of the merger phenomenon in higher education in its 
totality (its causes, process and outcomes) and the subsequent 
implications for managing it. This is accomplished in the following 
manner: 
1. The patterns and categories involved in the mergers of 
institutions of higher education are identified. 
2. The similarities and differences of the mergers are 
analyzed and compared to the literature to determine 
the conditions and elements that structure the merger 
phenomenon. 
3. Based on an understanding of these conditions and elements, 
strategies that assist policy-makers in deciding on and 
implementing a merger are presented. 
In the first chapter of the dissertation, the merger literature for the 
past twenty years is reviewed. The chapter focuses on four major aspects 
of the merger phenomenon—change, process, reasons creating the need 
for change and outcomes. Within each of these aspects, various themes 
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are identified and discussed. They include: the drastic nature of the 
required changes; the dominance of one of the parties; the negative 
impact on individuals; the complex process involving negotiations and 
legal issues; the impelling factors of financial exigency and political 
considerations; and the accomplishment of goals at a cost to individuals. 
In Chapter 2 the reasons why the institutions in this study sought to 
merge are examined. This leads to the clear distinction that public 
institutions are merged for different reasons than private institutions. 
For the former, the overriding reason is public policy initiatives to 
accommodate expanded educational opportunity and efficiency. For the 
latter group, the need to resolve financial exigency is the main reason. 
Although the motives are different, they share the common tension 
between forces for change and the status quo. They are similar in their 
pragmatic nature and the use of power in a hierarchical manner. They 
also share the characteristic of the promotion of self-interest of groups 
within a context of scarce resources. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the complexity of the merger process. As the 
process moves from the initiation stage to the negotiation stage, the 
emergence of one institution as the dominant force plays a key role in 
affecting the negotiations and changing initial expectations of the 
subordinate institution. Protecting self-interest, competing demands from 
various groups with differing beliefs, hierarchical decision-making and 
lack of consultation contribute to conflict during the process. The lack of 
adequate planning emerges as an important factor. Leadership and legal 
issues also play a role in affecting the process. 
In Chapter 4 the classic tension between organizational ends and 
individual needs in a merger situation is presented. The evaluation 
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indicates that the changes brought about by the mergers accomplish their 
institutional objectives at the cost of negatively affecting participants. 
Anger, bitterness and anxiety are byproducts of the process. Members of 
the less dominant institution experience decreased satisfaction with their 
jobs and the merger itself. 
In the final chapter, the synthesis of the findings concerning the 
reasons, process and outcomes leads to the general understanding of 
the merger phenomenon as a complex process in which change plays a 
major role. It concludes that significant change, crisis, conflict, 
hierarchical decision-making, negative impacts on individuals, 
dominance and poor planning are common elements of the merger 
process. A secondary conclusion is that the case studies are a valuable 
research source that provide the study with important distinctions not 
readily apparent in the literature. Based on an understanding of these 
common elements and specific differences, recommendations to utilize 
management strategies from the structural, human resource, political 
and symbolic perspectives in an integrated manner to facilitate change 
are presented. Strategic planning is also recommended as mechanism 
to enhance the merger process. 
It is important to note that the goal of this study is not to predict 
what will happen in every merger situation. In this study, a mosaic of 
understanding resulting from a synthesis of the elements, influences, 
patterns and implications of the merger phenomenon emerges. The 
recommendations of this study should help participants in 
implementing and coping with the merger process. 
The ultimate goal of this study is to contribute to making merger 
less traumatic and disruptive by providing a better understanding of 
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its nature and by presenting guidance on how to implement one in an 
effective manner. As a result of this study, I believe that a merger can 
be an appropriate strategy in dealing with change provided we 
recognize the role that change itself plays in the merger process. 
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Notes 
1 Since the founding of Harvard in 1636 through 1979, there have 
been approximately 2,000 mergers or closings of institutions 
of higher education [West 1980]. During the decade of the 1970s, 
a total of 45 independent institutions merged and from 1980 
through 1987, at least 11 institutions have merged according to 
the National Institute of Independent Colleges and Universities 
[1989]. Although comparable statistics do not exist for public 
institutions, a number of mergers have occurred over the same 
period of time. 
2 The three mergers were a) New Bedford Institute of Technology 
and Bradford-Durfee College of Technology into Southeastern 
Massachusetts Technological Institute; b) the Swain School of Art 
with Southeastern Massachusetts University's College of Visual 
and Performing Arts; and c) the merger of the University of 
Lowell, Southeastern Massachusetts University and the University 
of Massachusetts. 
3 The literature starting with 1970 was identified by employing an 
ERIC search for journal articles and books using the main 
identifiers of mergers and institutions of higher education. 
Bibliographies of the reports and articles identified through the 
ERIC search were also reviewed for pertinent works. 
4 This treatment of the qualitative data of the case studies is the 
analogue of meta-analysis in quantitative research. 
5 The four frames are described by Bolman and Deal [1984] as 
follows: 
a. The structural frame emphasizes the importance of formal 
roles and relationships. Organizational structures are 
created to fit an organization's environment and 
technology. 
b. The human resource frame stresses that the organization 
should be tailored to people. An organizational form is 
sought to enable people to get the job done while feeling 
good about their job. 
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c. The political frame views organizations as arenas of scarce 
resources where power and influence are constantly 
affecting the allocation of resources among individuals or 
groups. 
d. The symbolic frame considers the organization not in 
rational terms, but as theater or carnival. Organizations 
are viewed as held together more by shared values and 
culture than by goals and policies. 
CHAPTER 1 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
In analyzing the literature written during the period 1966-90 on 
mergers in higher education, various tensions emerge. They include the 
drastic changes for institutions and constituents, the complex process of 
negotiating terms, the financial and political factors that are impelling 
reasons and the negative impact on individuals. This chapter will address 
these tensive issues and their related aspects, identify alternatives and 
conclude with a summary of major points. 
Merger Changes and Their Effects 
By its very nature, a merger involves drastic change. In 
examining the generic definition of merger stated in the Introduction, 
it is obvious that the formal act of combining two or more institutions 
into a single corporate entity significantly changes the participating 
entities. Not only are governing boards affected, but the nature of the 
involved institutions is altered and their various constituencies must 
cope with change. Several writers have described these changes as 
drastic and dramatic. Cannon [1983] identifies merger as the most 
extreme form of inter-institutional arrangements. She concludes that 
institutions "undergo marked organizational changes which are in 
drastic contrast to those of institutions engaged in cooperation and 
coordination" [p. 5]. O'Neill and Barnett [1980] see merger as the most 
complete form of inter-institutional change because two or more legal 
entities become one. Bugliarello and Urrows [1976] describe it in the 
most dramatic terms as a drastic act with "irreversible totality—the 
legal death of one or both parties in the creation of a new one" [p. 102]. 
They conclude that it is an extreme answer to problems and concerns 
facing institutions of higher education. 
The drastic nature of the change to the governing body of an 
institution is evident when the two major types of merger are 
examined. O'Neill and Barnett [1980] give a clear description of 
these two types:* 
In a consolidation merger, two or more corporations 
dissolve their respective legal identities and become a 
wholly new corporation carrying forth all the properties 
and obligations of the former corporation. 
A dissolution/acquisition merger involves an agreement 
under which one institution is legally dissolved and its 
assets and liabilities are acquired with court approval 
by the surviving institution, [p. 20] 
Under each type, there is a loss of identity and autonomy for 
at least one partner. In a consolidation merger, Cannon [1983] 
maintains that because each institution loses its identity and 
autonomy and becomes an integral part of a new system, it follows 
that merger is an extreme change. Chambers [1981b] points out 
that about halfway through the 1970s mergers shifted from 
consolidation to the acquisition type, which represents a very 
powerful strategy for radical change. 
In her studies, Chambers raises the critical issue of 
dominance in the merger phenomena. She maintains that during the 
1970s, models suggesting equality between merging institutions 
had little success because the "prevalent atmosphere was one 
in which dominance became the issue" [1983, p. 5]. She 
concludes that what started out as a consolidation of equals, most 
frequently ended up as an acquisition with one entity dominating. 
When this happens, the dominate institutions will "most certainly be 
thinking in terms of radical change for the colleges they acquire" 
[1981b, p. 93]. 
When one institution is in a dominant position, changes in 
mission, programs and procedures for the weaker institution can 
be profound. This is especially true when a private institution seeks 
to merge with a public one. Bogue [1981] points out that this type of 
merger results in public control that weakens the distinctive mission 
and autonomy of the private college. In addition, the private 
institution must adjust to a legion of administrative changes ranging 
from state regulations and procedures to reporting relationships to 
personnel policies [Shirley and Peters, 1976]. The dominance of the 
public partner resulting in change of mission, loss of autonomy and 
increased bureaucratization are probably the reasons for 
Bugliarello and Urrows' [1976] finding that mergers between private 
institutions are more readily accomplished than between mixed 
control colleges. 
The significant changes brought about by merger are not 
limited to the governing boards, mission, programs and procedures 
of the institutions. The various constituent groups are definitely 
affected. O'Neill and Barnett [1980] posit that merging colleges is at 
best a stressful situation. They conclude that trustees and senior 
administrators "must be prepared to understand the effects of this 
stress on staff, on students, and even on alumni and their families, and 
they must be prepared to deal with them sympathetically and 
effectively" [p. 85]. This is succinctly stated in the observation that 
institutions can be partitioned, contracted and redesigned but people 
can not [McKeefery, 1981]. This stress increases the probability of 
resisting organizational change and according to O'Neill and Barnett 
[1980], triggers anger, bitterness, resentment, uncertainty and anxiety 
that may cause health problems. 
West [1980] maintains that merger is a traumatic experience 
characterized by tension and anxiety for both internal and 
external constituencies. This trauma is vividly described by 
Benezet [1983] as a thunderclap and bolt of lightning that gives 
a sense of uneasiness and a lack of confidence. This could account for 
the high probability of significant losses in the number of current 
faculty and students and alumni support in a merger situation 
identified by Gorman and Pappas [1989]. The importance of coping 
with stress is underscored by Cannon [1983] who concludes that the 
"success and viability of merger depends upon the participants' 
response to the changes demanded by merger" [p. 11].2 
The sense of loss resulting from merger appears to be greatest 
within the faculty ranks. Cannon [1983], Cass [1967], Peters [1977], 
Mingle, et al [1981], and Millett [1976], all found that mergers have a 
negative impact on faculty members. The impact factors included 
lower status, job loss, circumvention of contractual obligations, reduced 
level of job satisfaction, role tension, anxiety, loss of communal spirit, 
split between various faculty groups, and dissatisfaction with a new 
environment. Bugliarello and Urrows [1976] posit that a merger at its 
worst causes an avalanche of resignations and can poison institutional 
esprit during the course of negotiation. Even when a merger has been 
judged to be highly successful, morale can be adversely affected. In 
the Case Western Reserve situation, for example, Fischer [1978] 
reports that 11 years after the merger some faculty still had morale 
problems stemming from feelings of uncertain identity. She explains 
that prior to the merger, faculty had a sense of belonging to either the 
liberal arts or science/technology sphere. After the merger, this was 
not as clear cut. Wyatt [1986] sees merger as affecting morale by 
producing feelings of agony and powerlessness resulting from a direct 
attack on stability, which some faculty equate with professional 
fulfillment. 
Aside from the obvious concern over future employment for 
those involved in a merger, other factors have been identified as 
contributing to the strong emotional response on the part of various 
constituent groups. Thompson [1985] stipulates that people associated 
with higher education believe that educational institutions must be 
certain of success and cannot fail, even though they are subject to the 
same rapid changes in social, political and economic factors that cause 
businesses to fail. In the same vein, Benezet [1983] argues that people 
view an institution of higher education as a stable center of learning. 
When it comes to an abrupt or unforeseen end, the reaction is one 
of shock. Wyatt [1986] maintains that the closing of colleges is viewed 
as unnatural because of a tradition of people relying on and trusting 
institutions and the overall record of growth and expansion of higher 
education. People are thus conditioned to "look to the sunrise rather 
than the sunset" [p. 22]. Likewise, alumni tend to resist a merger 
because it "sullies a nostalgic vision of their youth" [Bugliarello and 
Urrows, 1976, p. 107]. 
It is interesting to note that not all participants in a merger are 
affected in the same manner. Where there is a perception that a 
merger is an acquisition rather than a marriage of equal institutions, 
employees of the acquired institution experience negative impacts. 
Shirley and Peters [1976] state it very specifically, "anxieties are 
exacerbated when employees already perceive themselves to be 
members of the weaker party to the merger" [p. 147]. In their case 
study, they found that the perceived dependency and subordination 
by the faculty and staff of the less dominant institution led to a 
stepchild mentality. 
How participants feel about a merger is also affected by their 
basic beliefs of how things should be done. Bennis [1977] observed 
that veteran faculty members were hurt, indignant and angry at major 
changes that took place at Buffalo shortly after it became part of the 
State University of New York and resisted change because they were 
not significantly involved in the planning. These findings support the 
contention of Gorman and Pappas [1989] that in a merger, 
organizational cultures of the two institutions must be examined 
"because ultimately the success or failure will be determined by the 
individual and collective behaviors, beliefs and assumptions of people" 
[p. B3]. They maintain that even the most elemental concepts may 
have different meanings across institutions and failure to recognize 
this can be fatal to meeting strategic objectives. 
In addressing the negative effects that merger has on 
participants, it may be helpful to consider the experience of business 
mergers in dealing with this particular outcome. Institutions of higher 
education are certainly not the same as for-profit businesses; they 
have vastly different missions. This does not mean, however, that 
institutions are unable to learn from business and adapt their solutions 
to similar problems being faced by higher education. They do share 
certain characteristics common to all bureaucracies.3 Unfortunately 
much of the literature on business mergers is focused on economic/ 
financial analysis of market forces and values of stock and as such 
does not apply to educational mergers [Chambers, 1986].^ 
Business firms have a long record of using mergers and 
acquisitions to facilitate growth [Shirley and Peters, 1976]. Shirley and 
Peters conclude that college administrators "may well be advised to 
study the organizational lessons already learned in business mergers" 
[p. 152]. They state that in the business sector, acquisitions are "too 
often consummated with little advance planning concerning post¬ 
merger relationships and operations" [p. 147]. They found that this 
was also true in a merger of two colleges that they studied. In 
horizontal business mergers of companies in different geographical 
areas, Shirley and Peters maintain that the resulting causes of 
resistance to change by employees have counterparts in academic 
mergers. They identify achieving a balance between autonomy and 
centralization, dealing with employee anxiety and establishing 
communication mechanisms as major issues that must be addressed to 
provide a smooth transition. 
In their comprehensive analysis of business mergers, Buono 
and Bowditch [1989] state that the turmoil, confusion and tension 
that employees experience can undo the most careful financial and 
strategic planning. In order to deal with this turmoil and the clash of 
cultures, they recommend establishing transition teams, offering 
morale boosting activities, creating effective communication channels, 
providing counseling and workshops for employees and conducting 
surveys to track morale. They also are concerned that research 
indicates that "human resource considerations play a relatively small 
role in merger and acquisition decisions" [p. 22]. They conclude that it 
is unfortunate that most analysts involved in merger assessments 
usually disregard human dynamics and the financial ramifications of 
post merger personnel problems.^ 
The Merger Process 
A merger, with its variety of required changes, is not an event 
but rather a process. The tensions in the dynamics of this process also 
center on factors associated with change in any organization. These 
issues include risk, uncertainty, negotiation, leadership and planning. 
Legal issues and the possibility of litigation also complicate the 
process. In his extensive case study, Millett [1976] found that the 
process of merger is not a simple procedure and is time-consuming. 
Within this process, he stipulates that the conducting of negotiation 
and the reaching of agreement can be laborious. This is vividly 
detailed by Dr. Eldon Smith of the National Council of Independent 
Colleges and Universities who is quoted as saying that "negotiating a 
permanent new structure is such a punishing process that many 
institutions get to the verge of merger but do not show up at the altar" 
[Bugliarello and Urrows, 1976, pp. 101-102]. Chambers [1981a] in her 
study of mergers in New York state concluded that they represent a 
"multiplication of institutional complexity with problems so 
idiosyncratic that each merger must be hand-tailored" [p. 26]. This is 
probably why she describes merger as a daring adventure that is "as 
tough as it gets" [1983, p. 23]. 
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Negotiation Issues 
There are several issues relating to the actual merger process. 
The first centers around issues involving confidentiality and 
consultation. At the initial stage of consideration, presidents, key 
administrators and trustees are usually involved in determining if the 
merger is desirable [Millett, 1976]. If the initial response is favorable, 
then negotiation of particulars are initiated. Millett notes that there is 
a tendency for negotiation to be conducted in an atmosphere of 
secrecy and that there is "little disposition on the part of presidents to 
discuss the desirability of merger with faculty leaders, student leaders 
or community leaders" [p. 34]. He claims that any such discussions 
would become public knowledge and most likely lead to efforts to 
prevent the merger. 
The balance between confidentiality and consultation is not 
easily attained. Fischer [1978] states that in the Case/Westem 
Reserve merger, faculty were not consulted in advance because 
they would not have approved the merger. This led to indignation 
on their part. Although Benezet [1983] recommends some secrecy in 
the early stages, he posits that "all too often the tremors that come 
with a proposed merger reflect a poor communication system between 
the administration and the faculty and the student body" [p. 41]. He 
concludes that the operational meaning of consultation is difficult and 
controversial, but if genuine progress is made on this chronic problem, 
the results will better prepare institutions for merger. His view is 
shared by Chambers [1983], Bugliarello and Urrows [1976], and 
Thompson [1985]. 
The second major issue involving the process of merger is the 
negotiation of matters pertaining to the faculty and staff. It is in this 
area that the process can be the most difficult. The transfer of faculty 
and staff has been identified as a major sore point in negotiations 
between merging institutions [O’Neill and Barnett, 1980]. They 
maintain that ’’the number of faculty jobs offered to the smaller 
partner is almost bound to be a source of disenchantment" [p. 27]. 
They conclude that the dealing with faculty and staff issues is one of 
the most time-consuming and difficult areas because legal, moral and 
psychological issues are entwined with decisions. Thompson [1970] 
similarly contends that mergers are not easy because of resistance. 
This surfaces because the status of individuals will be changed, pride 
in institutional identity is threatened and personnel policies are 
modified. The absorption of faculty "creates the greatest obstacle to an 
affiliation" [Thompson, 1985, p. 22]. He maintains that faculty are not 
only concerned about job security, but also facilities, equipment, 
teaching load and research expectations. He also cites that collective 
bargaining agreements can exacerbate negotiations. 
Failure to address faculty concerns could certainly complicate the 
merger process. Peters [1977] theorizes that his finding that faculty 
problems impeded achievement of merger objectives resulted from 
their low level of participation in merger negotiations.6 Another 
danger is that if faculty feel that they will not benefit from merger, 
some of the ablest and most mobile will go elsewhere [Bugliarello and 
Urrows, 1976]. 
The third major issue involving the merger process concerns 
reputation and financial risks. Where institutions have not had a 
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history of cooperation, a substantial difference in reputation may 
serve to block the merger. When reputations are balanced, the 
successor would benefit from preserving both identities which in turn 
would make merger easier to negotiate [Chambers, 1983]. Chambers 
concludes that differences in reputation will pervade negotiations and 
"probably more than any other single factor determine their outcome" 
[p. 11]. This is substantiated by the findings of a study [1987] she 
conducted on private institution mergers that took place over the 
course of a decade. 
Associated with reputation is the issue of financial risk. Since in 
many instances at least one of the partners in a merger is experiencing 
financial difficulty, fiscal matters including debt and credit become a 
major consideration. Issues such as financial obligations, endowments, 
grants with restrictions, government funds, etc. must be resolved. 
Thompson [1985] concludes that "the disposition of physical property 
and the details associated with the financial aspects of merger involve 
laborious proceedings" [p. 22]. Chambers [1981b] maintains that 
"the most important factor colleges need to know about when 
negotiating a merger is the basic financial structure that underlies the 
process" [p. 97]. She concludes that not only must there be financial 
gain for each party, there must be enough extra value for the 
successor institution to make the merger worth all the risk and time. 
The issue of financial risk can be minimized in negotiating a 
merger. O'Neill and Barnett [1980] stress that what one institution has 
to offer another institution with a stronger market position must be 
presented so that the merger is seen to be of value to both parties. 
The strategy for the weaker institution is to present a package of both 
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assets and liabilities and anticipate what value the other institution 
will place on these assets and how that institution will respond to the 
risks involved. They state that the strategy for the stronger institution 
must be to maximize the ability to fulfill its mission by securing 
enrollment increases, property and endowment while minimizing 
liability, such as taking over debt and tenured faculty who duplicate 
current strength. They conclude that the weaker institution should set 
aside the collegial model of cooperation and "think instead of the 
business arrangements that might prove workable given the devalued 
worth of its assets" [p. 26]. 
Leadership and Planning 
Leadership plays an important role in the merger process given 
the sensitive nature of the issues to be negotiated. Chambers [1983] 
contends that "merger results from a very human act of assessment, 
based on fallible perceptions, estimates and comparisons" [p. 8]. 
Within this context, she maintains that usually a strong leader, such as 
a president, powerful trustee or donor, controls the direction of the 
merger attempt. In moving an institution through major change such 
as a merger, Norman [1987] posits that strong leadership—a dynamic 
and decisive president and board—is required. Bugliarello and Urrows 
[1976] also identify leadership as one of the important factors in 
successful mergers. 
A major reason why leadership is important may stem from the 
conservative nature of trustees. Chambers [1983] contends that 
boards of trustees, which have to make the final decision on mergers, 
have both risk and uncertainty to contend with as issues. Because of 
the trust relationship, boards are not great risk takers. She concludes 
that "where neither outcomes nor their probabilities are known, 
uncertainty adds to this already conservative slant, making it harder 
to choose a risky venture, such as merger" [p. 9]. 
Leadership alone, however, can not guarantee a successful 
process. The literature is permeated with passages extolling the 
need for careful planning of mergers. Thompson [1985] advises 
that strategic planning is essential, especially to accommodate the 
emotional and political dimensions of a merger decision. In his case 
study of a failed merger attempt between Detroit Institute of 
Technology and Wayne State University, he found that the primary 
reason for failure was the lack of strategic planning. Gorman and 
Pappas [1989] similarly strongly support careful planning when 
considering a merger. They state that "all too often, merger planning 
limits itself to the requisite legal transactions, changes in the policies 
and procedures, and, perhaps, some strategic curricular reform" 
[p. B3]. They claim this is done at the expense of formulating an 
intentional implementation plan that addresses a fundamental 
restructuring. Also, Martin and Samels [1989], Shirley and Peters 
[1976], and O'Neil and Barnett [1980] all point out the importance of 
planning. 
Despite detailed planning, unexpected issues and problems will 
surface during the process. A major conclusion of Millett's study 
[1976] was that the process of merger and its implementation present 
complexities not always foreseen. This was also true for the Tennessee 
State University merger in which Matlock and Humphries [1979] found 
that the merger plan "as with all plans, could not possibly have 
anticipated all the various merger-related contingencies" [p. 21]. 
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Lewis [1981] reaches a similar conclusion that a single merger 
agreement can not answer all the important questions. 
The literature indicates that when leaders are developing merger 
plans and going through the process, they should continuously focus on 
the positive outcomes for the successor institution [Chambers, 1983; 
Millett, 1976; and Bugliarello and Urrows, 1976]. This will help all 
concerned parties overcome the intermediate obstacles and problems. 
Perhaps the accentuation of the positive is best summarized by 
Chambers: "College merger requires investment, knowledge, dexterity, 
luck, wisdom, and the courage to be consumed for the sake of some 
better future" [p. 23]. She adds that the involved parties should invent 
the future together in an atmosphere of mutual trust. 
Legal Issues 
Legal considerations concerning the technical process of merger 
are of major concern because of possible litigation and liability factors. 
Chambers [1981a] claims that there could be more court involvement 
in retrenchment mergers because this is the age of litigation. Hample 
[1982] identifies liability issues that might lead to various groups 
bringing suit when campuses or programs are closed. He contends that 
laid-off faculty may sue on any of three grounds: violation of freedom 
of speech, deprivation of constitutional right of due process and 
violation of contractual obligations. He maintains that institutions 
appear "to have a reasonable amount of flexibility and a good legal 
defense where program closure was caused by financial exigency" 
[p. 50]. He cautions, however, that such a defense can quickly 
disappear if the institution's stated procedures are not followed. 
Students may also bring suit on the grounds that the institution has 
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violated a quasi-contractual obligation to provide instruction in return 
for tuition and fees. He recommends that institutions allow students to 
voice objections (due process) and seek methods that will minimize 
damage to students (phasing out programs, arranging transfer, and 
merging with other programs). O'Neill and Barnett [1980] conclude 
that "courts will hold the trustees responsible for weighing all the 
available options—and for documenting why they have chosen one 
option rather than another" [p. 17]. 
Both public and private institutions of higher education exist 
under various laws that regulate their operation.^ When considering a 
merger, the statutes, charter and bylaws that govern each institution 
must be examined. Although laws vary from state to state, there 
generally are explicit statutory procedures for amending corporate 
purposes and bylaws [Meyer, 1970]. O'Neill and Barnett [1980] give an 
excellent summary by state of the regulations for the closing and 
merging of nonprofit colleges. 
In addition to the general requirements imposed by statutes and 
charters, a merger involves several technical legal issues. As an initial 
step, the institutions should identify all parties with a legal interest in 
the merger. If courts become involved in reviewing merger 
agreements, they would be concerned that "all interested parties were 
informed and agreed to the final outcome. The college would have to 
show that all legal obligations—including fiduciary ones—were met" 
[O’Neill and Barnett, 1980, p. 29]. Benezet [1983] states that many 
regional accrediting commissions have adopted policy guidelines which 
suggest that the entire set of operations involving merger or closure 
should be considered "a legally guided series of several steps that will 
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stand up before any bar of review" [p. 39]. The legal issues in mergers 
are not necessarily the most important one, but they do influence 
decisions that must be made [Meyer, 1970].8 
Situational Factors Impelling Merger 
Given that a merger involves drastic change and is a process 
requiring strong leadership and detailed planning to overcome risk, 
uncertainty, liability and potential opposition including litigation over 
a variety of issues, why would an institution consider such an extreme 
action? Perhaps Millett's [1976] findings based on 10 case studies 
offer a possible explanation. He concludes that the need for merger 
was usually so apparent as a solution to problems and an alternative 
to merger so elusive, that the merger process was consummated in 
order to preserve essential educational services and opportunities. 
In analyzing the literature, it appears that at least one of the 
merger partners is usually under a great deal of stress due to one or 
more factors. They include financial exigency, political intervention, 
concerns about quality, and limitations of access and equal 
opportunity. These factors are strong enough to propel an institution 
to consider merger. 
Financial 
Financial exigency is identified as the most prevalent reason for a 
merger [Millett, 1976; Chambers, 1981b; West, 1980; and Benezet, 
1983]. Bugliarello and Urrows [1976] state that they have "yet to find 
a merger that did not have as its basis a fear of what would happen if 
merger did not take place" [p. 101]. They theorize that trustees are 
unlikely to take the drastic act of merger unless survival is at stake. 
The attractiveness of mergers for a financially struggling institution is 
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that trustees view it as a reasonable way to fulfill their fiduciary 
responsibilities and to provide continuity in education and 
employment for students, faculty and staff [O’Neill and Barnett, 1980]. 
Millett [1976] found that the mergers he studied were proof of 
financial difficulty in the private sector. He hypothesized that fiscal 
reasons are the essential motivation for merger. He does not limit 
fiscal reasons to immediate shortfall but includes the desire on the 
part of an institution to strengthen its financial position. 
The reasons why institutions find themselves in fmancial 
difficulty are varied. Millett [1976] suggests that size might be a 
factor. Small institutions in the private sector which rely on tuition 
and fees as their main source of income do not share an economy of 
scale that larger institutions enjoy. Benezet [1983] and a study 
conducted by the Florida Postsecondary Education Planning 
Commission [1986] identified enrollment decline as a contributory’ 
factor to financial difficulty in institutions whose financing is 
enrollment driven. West [1980] and Benezet [1983] postulate that 
poor management also contributes to financial problems. 
Financial motivation for merger is not restricted to the private 
sector. In the public sector, a merger can be used to increase 
resources or for retrenchment purposes resulting from reduced 
financial support or declining demand. Cass [1967], in his study of the 
merger that eventually created Southeastern Massachusetts 
University, found that financial benefits for the merged institution was 
a major reason for the merger. Lewis [1981] cites the merger of Newr 
College and the University of South Florida as an example of howr the 
state can expand programs at less cost and continue programs that 
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separately might not be possible. Although Mingle et al [1981] believe 
the merging of public institutions will be rare, they maintain that 
merger is one retrenchment solution to the problem of enrollment 
decline and financial cutbacks. Chambers [1981a] describes public 
mergers in glowing terms: "College merger can provide a creative and 
relatively incremental means for reducing a system of higher 
education to match diminished demand" [p. 1]. 
Although some writers consider coeducation as a reason for 
merger, it appears that a financial reason is the underlying motivation 
for many of these mergers. Although social factors stemming from 
sexual nondiscrimination may have contributed to five women's 
colleges mergers with other institutions in the sixties, Millett [1976] 
found that financial difficulty resulting from low enrollment was the 
basic reason for these mergers. 
It must be noted that a merger is not always the ultimate panacea 
for institutions facing financial problems. Thompson [1985] points out 
that two institutions having financial difficulty should not merge 
because the successor institution will most likely struggle also. The 
recent closing due to financial difficulty of Mercer University's College 
of Arts and Sciences, acquired in a 1972 merger, is a case in point 
["Mercer's College," 1990]. Bugliarello and Urrows [1976] maintain that 
trustees take the drastic act of merger "with reluctance, only when 
they see salvation or an enormous advantage. When gains are 
marginal they will not risk merger" [p. 112]. O'Neill and Barnett [1980] 
caution that to a small, financially struggling college "the reality of 
merger may turn out to be less attractive than surface appearances 
would warrant" [p. 25]. 
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The second situational factor that propels an institution into a 
merger is political intervention. Mergers involving public institutions 
have by their very nature political implications. A classic example is 
presented by the merger of the University of Wisconsin and the 
Wisconsin State University Systems where the governor was the prime 
mover for the merger. Then Governor Patrick J. Lucey pushed the 
merger through the legislature despite opposition from educational 
boards, administrators and faculty, and public indifference [Shaw, 
1973]. His stated motivation to the voters was that the state was 
experiencing "days of austerity" and that the merger would "save the 
taxpayers money" [Shaw, 1973, p. 40]. 
The merger of three institutions located in the nation's capital into 
the University of the District of Columbia also illustrates the influence 
of politics. Gordon [1976] uses strong language by claiming that "old- 
fashioned power politics" had been involved in the university's 
creation [p. 22]. She claims that the original merger bill, largely 
written by the president of one of the institutions, would have reduced 
the other principal institution involved to a very subordinate role in 
the merged institution. Political reasons played a different role in the 
merger of two institutions with strong local ties to the cities in which 
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they were located into what is now Southeastern Massachusetts 
University. According to Cass [1967], a major reason contributing to 
the merger was the desire to escape the local political domination and 
patronage that existed at the predecessor institutions. 
In Millett's study [1976], political considerations were a major 
influence in four instances.9 In each case the mergers resulted from 
strong efforts by politicians in the local area and a favorable political 
climate in state government. Millett concludes that: 
It is reasonable to generalize that any merger involving 
state government funding or state government legislative 
action is necessarily a merger made possible only by 
political considerations involving the various parties 
to the transaction. Governmental action is politics and 
mergers of higher education institutions sometimes can 
and do involve governmental action, [pp. 22-23] 
Another aspect of political intervention is the desire on the part 
of public officials to use mergers to correct the lack of coordination 
among institutions. In the proposed 1979 reorganization of two-year 
colleges in Alabama, mergers were recommended because the current 
system had been developed with little thought to coordination and 
planning [Mingle, et al, 1981]. In Connecticut the proposal to merge 
community colleges with technical colleges was based on the premise 
that it would enhance the coordination of curriculum [Mingle, et al]. In 
Massachusetts, the same writers found that the absence of a strong 
statewide coordinating mechanism contributed to the merger of Boston 
State College and the University of Massachusetts at Boston. 
One of the reasons given for the merger creating a single 
University of Wisconsin system was to eliminate the weak 
Coordinating Council for Higher Education [Shaw, 1973]. Evidently the 
council was unable to eliminate unnecessary duplication and 
competition. Merger was seen by its proponents as a way to solve this 
problem. Governor Lucey particularly singled out the "expensive 
duplication of graduate programs in both systems" as one of the 
reasons for merger [Shaw, p. 40]. In Florida, the primary reasons cited 
by the Legislature in directing a study to be done on forming a single 
public four-year institution with multiple campuses was "the 
development of a structure for ensuring coordination and the delivery 
of educational opportunities" [Florida Commission, 1986, p. i].10 
It is interesting to note that Mingle, et al [1981] predicted that the 
merging and closing of public institutions during the 1980s would be 
rare because of political constraints. They base this conclusion on the 
premise that institutions and their supporters go to great extremes to 
avoid mergers and closings, thereby making the political costs too high. 
This prediction is validated by Jaschik [1987] who reports that citizen 
campaigns made it nearly impossible to close or merge public 
institutions in the 1980s. Even when only one of the institutions is 
public, the political debate can be difficult and acrimonious [Bogue, 
1981]. Mingle and his associates suggest that one solution to keeping 
politics out of the consideration is "to provide greater incentives for 
campuses or systems to engage in serious self-contraction" [p. 296].* 1 
They further state that any public institution considering merger will 
need to obtain firm gubernatorial support. 
Quality Improvement 
The need to improve the quality of programs or enhance 
academic excellence is a third situational factor that moves an 
institution to consider a merger. Thompson [1970] maintains that 
"breadth, depth, accreditation and enrichment of academic programs 
may all be promoted by a merger" [p. 4-96]. He concludes that when 
specialized schools merge with larger institutions, students benefit 
from greater faculty competence in a large number of fields. This 
level of competence could not be attained by the smaller school. He 
also claims that larger departments offer a greater variety of courses 
and permit a higher degree of specialization. 
The merger that created Case Western Reserve University 
illustrates the improved academic quality of the succeeding institution. 
Fischer [1978] states that the motivation for the merger was "to bring 
into being a nationally recognized community of academic excellence" 
[p. 38]. She concluded 11 years after the merger that it has worked 
successfully and the institution is thriving. A similar note has recently 
been sounded in the Kansas Board of Regents' approval of the merger 
of Kansas State University and the Kansas College of Technology. The 
merger has been described as "not only a move of economy but an 
enhancement of quality" [Cage, 1990]. 
In the study by Millett [1976], the drive for academic excellence 
was a motivational factor in four cases. In each of these cases it was 
anticipated that academic excellence would be more readily brought 
about and sustained than if the institution had not merged. * 2 Martin 
and Samels [1989] claim that a new perspective on mergers is 
emerging. It is one of moving away from the usual focus of managing 
decline to a view that mergers are creative and effective means to 
achieve academic excellence by improving quality. An example of this 
is the recently considered merger of the University of Baltimore and 
the University of Maryland-Baltimore County in which the proponents 
argued that it would improve the quality of public higher education 
[Jaschik, 1990a]. 
Access and Equal Opportunity 
A final reason for a merger involves providing equal access for 
minorities and the desegregation of institutions. In a significant 
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decision, the United State's Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in 1979 
that the utilization of merger was a viable strategy for accomplishing 
desegregation in higher education. The court action mandated the 
merger of the University of Tennessee at Nashville, a predominately 
white institution into Tennessee State University, a predominately 
black institution. This was the first case of a court-ordered merger 
resulting in the surviving institution being a predominately black 
institution [Matlock and Humphries, 1979]. In studying this merger, 
Matlock and Humphries observe that some states, in considering ways 
to desegregate their dual systems of higher education, view merging 
black schools into white ones as possible, and often times the only 
solution. They claim that the merging of white institutions into black 
institutions is rarely mentioned even though some of the black schools 
have been functioning much longer. 
The implementation of mergers to effect desegregation may be 
considered by the states of Mississippi and Alabama. In February 
1990, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that 
Mississippi operates an illegally segregated university system of five 
predominately white universities and three historically black 
universities ["Mississippi Must Desegregate," 1990]. Alabama is 
currently facing legal action involving desegregation of its colleges 
[Jaschik, 1990b]. Mingle et al [1981] cautions, however, that black 
colleges will strongly fight merger in order to retain their identities. 
They cite experiences in Maryland in 1979 and Alabama in 1980 when 
"supporters of the black colleges filled the meeting rooms to 
overflowing and provided enough opposition so that the 
proposals...were dropped or postponed" [Mingle et al, 1981, p. 295]. 
Other Reasons for Merger 
In addition to the above stated factors impelling institutions to 
seek merger, several other facilitation factors are identified in the 
literature. They include previous cooperation, geographical proximity 
and program/mission changes. 
When institutions have had a history of collaborating on 
various projects and programs, the decision to merge their entire 
operation may be facilitated. Millett [1976] details four instances 
where collaboration was present prior to merger. He cites the 
cooperation of Case Institute of Technology and Western Reserve 
University as a prime example of how collaboration facilitated the 
merger discussion. Fischer [1978] colorfully illustrates the role of this 
collaboration by quoting the President of Western Reserve: "'We’ve 
been going steady for about 10 years; we've been sleeping together for 
about 5 years—and its about time we got married'" [p. 39]. 
Cooperation between institutions as a facilitation factor has also been 
documented by Chambers [1981b] and Thompson [1985]. 
Millett [1976] observes that because cooperation between 
institutions has its own advantages, it does not necessarily mean 
an intention to merge. He does, however, identify a pattern of 
cooperation as "a positive influence encouraging an eventual merger of 
two institutions" [p. 18]. He theorizes that the process of cooperation 
may be so troublesome that both parties view merger as preferable to 
the complication of continued joint action. If this is not the case, he 
postulates that merger may be viewed by the institutions as the logical 
sequel of cooperation and increased collaboration. 
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The geographical location of institutions in relationship to each 
other can also facilitate merger. In Millett's 1976 study, 
geographical proximity played a principal role. Thompson [1970] 
maintains that if other things are equal, "a merger is more likely to 
take place between two adjacent institutions than between two that 
are geographically separate" [p. 4-29]. Geographic factors, however, 
are not limited to the mere fact of proximity. Millett maintains that 
from 1945 to 1970, state governments and state universities reversed 
their earlier stance of locating institutions away from the emerging 
concentrations of urban population. He found that "some part of the 
story of mergers is a story of this adjustment of public higher 
education to the realities of a predominately urban society with a 
variety of ethnic populations" [p. 14]. 13 Chambers [1981b], Myers 
[1990], and Mangan [1990] also identify the desire of public 
institutions to expand into a particular geographical area as a reason 
for merger. 
A merger may also be appealing to institutions in order to expand 
academic programs that complement rather than duplicate current 
course offerings. Chambers [1981b] maintains that institutions may be 
amenable to a merger in order to "expand their programming and 
diversify their activities so that they are less vulnerable to shifts in 
demands for particular programs" [p. 92]. She also suggests that 
institutions with research orientations may seek a merger with 
professional schools in order to counteract the uncertainties of federal 
support. Conversely, schools with high quality professional programs 
might seek a merger with research institutions to gain research or 
enrollment potential. 
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It is possible that differences in programs of two institutions may 
facilitate a merger more than institutions with similar programs. 
Millett [1976] concluded that "to some degree, complementary 
institutional programs rather than duplicated or competing programs 
appeared to encourage mergers" [p. 19]. This contention is also 
supported by Cannon [1983] and Bugliarello and Urrows [1976]. The 
latter postulate that dissimilar and complementary mergers involve 
less tension than those joining similar institutions and therefore are 
more likely to occur. 
The motivation to merge, however, is not restricted to 
diversification of programs. The desire to lessen competition and 
eliminate duplication is also a motivating factor. In the Wisconsin 
merger, Shaw [1973] claims that part of the contributing reason was to 
end unnecessary duplication and competition. In the recent merger of 
the University of Detroit and Mercy College, the elimination of 
duplicate programs and the saving of money were given as reasons for 
the consolidation ["Two Catholic Colleges," 1990]. Some argue that the 
solidification of a strategic position in a local or regional market is a 
valid reason to merge [Martin and Samels, 1989]. 
Closely intertwined with program factors is the issue of 
institutional mission. If an institution wishes to change its mission, 
merging with another college to create an entirely new institution is an 
alternative. Martin and Samels [1989] contend that merger is one of 
the most creative and effective means for academic planners to 
articulate new missions. They cite as a pertinent example the merger 
of Widener University (small university), the Delaware Law School and 
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Brandywine College (a junior college) into one full-service regional 
university. 1 4 
The Outcomes of Merger 
The literature indicates that most mergers accomplish many of 
the original purposes for which the process was initiated. This 
positive outcome, however, comes at a price for the institution and the 
people involved. As stated earlier, institutional identity of at least one 
participant is lost and faculty, students and alumni are adversely 
affected in various ways. Because of this, merger could be described 
as bitter medicine to facilitate a better future. Bugliarello and Urrows 
[1976] state it graphically: "The aftermath of an academic merger is 
like having all your teeth out. When we look back at what has 
happened, long after the novocaine has worn off, the gains may well 
be worth the pains" [p. 95]. 
When the main reason for a merger is financial exigency, the 
merger usually results in creating a successor institution with a degree 
of financial stability. In a survey of 31 mergers over a nine-year 
period, it was found that improved financial support was the most 
frequent advantage of merger [Peters, 1977]. In the study conducted 
by Millett [1976] both financial improvement and payment of 
creditors resulted from those mergers where financial exigency was 
a factor. 
A merger involving a financially troubled institution, however, 
does not automatically ensure financial stability for the successor 
institution. If both institutions have deficit operations, their joining is 
likely to compound rather than solve their problems [Bugliarello and 
Urrows, 1976]. Gorman and Pappas [1989] warn that lasting economy 
of scale is not necessarily the case in all mergers. Also, the lack of 
potential financial savings could scuttle merger efforts. This, along 
with the potential decrease of community support resulting from a loss 
of identity, were cited as reasons why the proposed merger between 
Florida Atlantic University and Florida International University was 
not consummated [Florida Commission, 1986]. The Florida Commission 
in fact concluded that most public mergers result in additional 
expenses because of added bureaucracy and increased state spending 
to appease disgruntled constituencies. 
In addition to improved financial status, other positive effects of 
merger have been documented. The merger of New College and the 
University of South Florida resulted in New College continuing its 
identity through a flexible, individualized and freedom of choice 
program of studies [Scheuerle, 1979]. Improvement in quality of 
instructional programs, enrollment increase and campus expansion 
were present in varying degrees in the mergers studied by Millett 
[1976]. In Peters' survey [1977], improved or elimination of duplicate 
programs was identified by twelve institutions as a positive outcome 
of merger. 
Alternatives to Merger 
Because a merger is a complex process that involves high risk 
and negative impacts on individuals, alternatives should be given 
consideration. Mergers are not the only means available to achieve 
strategic objectives of a merger [Gorman and Pappas, 1989]. Within 
the literature, identified alternatives range along a continuum from 
management changes within an institution to cooperative efforts with 
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other institutions to the drastic measure of closure. This section will 
briefly discuss these alternatives. 
Internal Changes 
For institutions facing financial exigency, several alternatives 
involving internal action exist to improve its fiscal position and 
thereby avoid a merger. They basically center on the actions of 
increasing revenue, decreasing costs and implementing management 
changes. They include raising tuition and expanding only on the basis 
of tuition [Thompson, 1970], pursuing more aggressive investments to 
gain a higher rate of return on endowment [Grassmuck, 1990], 
maximizing the use of facilities [Vecchione, 1981], and down-sizing of 
programs and staff [McIntyre, 1990 and Grassmuck, 1990]. Other 
management techniques include the development of market strategies 
for recruiting students and the implementation of strategic planning, 
which involves systematically setting goals and formulating plans 
for achieving them [Grassmuck, 1990]. Institutions could also become 
more efficient by being more management conscious and utilizing 
information systems and technology to perform their functions 
[McIntyre, 1990]. 
A more radical approach to financial problems involves changing 
the mission of the institution or its form of control. Vecchione [1981] 
states that institutions wanting to implement innovative programs to 
increase enrollment and income may have to change the personality of 
the school and its mission. In the 1970s, New York University took the 
drastic step of restructuring its mission to survive financial problems 
[Baldridge, 1977]. McKeefery [1981] in his study of five private 
institutions which entered into public partnership by accepting state 
funding, found positive outcomes even though crises were often the 
trigger for the change. He found that although governance is altered, 
organization revised, accountability instituted and service to a 
particular public mandated, "institutional self-determination is 
still a large component of these private-public partnerships" [p. 64]. 
Thompson [1970] and O’Neill and Barnett [1980] also see public 
funding as a way of solving financial problems. 
Cooperative Measures 
Various forms of cooperative arrangements can be entered into 
by an institution in order to improve quality, lower costs and expand 
opportunity. Voluntary cooperation, sometimes referred to as 
affiliation, enables institutions to establish reciprocal arrangements 
that are characterized by a less formalized structure than other forms 
of cooperation [Cannon, 1983]. Under this type of agreement. Cannon 
points out that the identities, charters, powers and corporate 
structures of affiliated institutions remain intact. Staff from two or 
more institutions working together on a particular project is a basic 
example of this type of cooperation. Bugliarello and Urrows [1976] 
add that affiliation is the loosest cooperative arrangement and it is 
"a linkage that lasts only as long as both parties benefit" [p. 99]. 
The next highest level of cooperation is consortium. Cannon 
[1983] describes it as an arrangement in which "institutions join 
together to formally share programs, services, facilities, students and 
staff" [p. 3]. Under this arrangement, participating institutions have 
formal agreements while maintaining separate corporate identity. The 
Five College Consortium involving the University of Massachusetts, 
Amherst and nearby colleges is an example of this arrangement. 
Patterson [1974] lists the advantages of consortia as increasing 
diversity, quality of programs and scope of services, while decreasing 
costs. O'Neill and Barnett [1980] maintain, however, that consortia are 
unlikely to be the answer to severe financial or management 
difficulties because members assume financial responsibility for only 
those activities that are specified in the joint venture agreement. 
The highest level of cooperation is federation. Under this 
arrangement, two or more institutions "retain their corporate identities 
but agree to surrender to a central administration, a measure of 
autonomy in the overall management of the combined institution" 
[O'Neill and Barnett, 1980, p. 18]. According to O'Neill and Barnett, it is 
in theory a compact among equals that tends to work best where 
institutions complement rather than duplicate each other's 
programs.* ^ 
Termination 
There exists at least two rather drastic options to cooperation and 
merger. They are bankruptcy and closure. Vecchione [1981] states 
that historically bankruptcy has been viewed incorrectly as a criminal 
act. He maintains that it can be a valuable tool for a troubled 
institution to gain needed time to regroup and reorganize. He 
concludes that the filing of a Chapter 11 "can bring into one proceeding 
all of the problems that need attention and resolution. The protection 
of the court affords the institution the time and opportunity to address 
all of its problems and to develop a cohesive plan for resolving them" 
[p. 14]. O'Neill and Barnett [1980] conclude that although Chapter 11 is 
seldom used, it is most appropriate when an institution has sufficient 
non-liquid assets to make a successful reorganization likely. 
When an institution can not negotiate a merger or institute 
one of the options identified in this section, closing becomes the only 
option if it is unable to operate in the black. Closing has been 
described as "a painful, difficult, and certainly the most final of all 
types of corporate change” [O'Neill and Barnett, 1980, p. 55]. Millett 
[1976] found that "the closing of a college presented even more 
sensitive issues than those involved in a merger. One reason for this 
sensitivity is that a closing is very likely to result in litigation" [p. 72]. 
He found that in the five closings studied, an income-expenditure gap 
was the immediate cause of closure, each lacked an endowment of any 
size, and management circumstances of each college contributed to 
eventual failure. He argues that business failures are a common 
phenomenon and there is no reason why such failures may not also 
occur in higher education. 
Sil-mmary 
A merger, by its very nature, is a drastic change for participating 
institutions, their governing boards and constituencies. Institutional 
changes include dissolution of boards of trustees, alteration of mission 
and programs, and modification of organization and procedures. These 
changes occur whether the merger is of the consolidation type (all 
boards replaced by a new one) or the dissolution/acquisition type (one 
board takes over other boards). During the 1970s, this latter type of 
merger has replaced the consolidation type as the most common. 
Under both types of merger, one institution usually takes a 
dominant role because of reputation, size, financial condition or 
other factors. This is especially true when a private institution 
mergers with a public one. The dominance of the public institution 
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resulting in loss of autonomy for the private entity may be one reason 
why mergers between private institutions are more readily 
accomplished that between mixed control institutions. 
A merger has a dramatic impact on faculty, staff, students and 
alumni. It is a stressful situation that employees view as a major life 
change. This triggers resistance, anger, resentment, anxiety, decreased 
job satisfaction, role tension and low morale. The situation is further 
exacerbated when employees consider themselves as belonging to the 
less dominant institution. Therefore, organizational culture and 
transitional stress should be addressed. In this regard institutions can 
benefit from business merger experience. In many instances students 
are also disrupted. Alumni also feel a sense of loss accentuated by 
their loyalty to alma mater. 
A merger is a complex, time consuming and difficult process 
that involves negotiation and detailed planning. Problems may be so 
idiosyncratic that each merger must be hand-tailored. Negotiation is 
often characterized by secrecy, difficulty in arranging transfer of 
faculty and staff, and concern over institutional reputation and 
financial risk. Faculty and staff status is usually the most difficult and 
major obstacle in the process. Leadership, strategic planning, 
involvement of constituencies, and emphasis on positive outcomes are 
necessary for successful mergers. Unexpected issues will undoubtedly 
surface during the process. Because of the complex nature of the 
merger process, liability litigation on behalf of faculty and students is 
a distinct possibility. If litigation occurs, courts will examine if 
trustees considered all options and the reasons why they choose a 
merger over other options. 
Despite the complexity and difficulty of the process, mergers 
have been consummated either to attain a greater good or to alleviate 
situational factors that threaten the educational enterprise. In the 
latter case, there must be a clear gain for participating institutions. In 
the 1960s, expansion and growth were prime motives for mergers. In 
the 1970s, the main force was financial exigency. It appears that in 
the 1980s, there is a combination of financial exigency and 
improvement of quality as a major cause. 
Political intervention for fiscal reasons and to improve 
coordination has also been a merger impelling factor. The mergers of 
public institutions imposed by state authorities, however, may be 
rare because constituents of institutions who are opposed go to the 
extreme, making political cost too high. Another reason for mergers is 
that mission and programs can be expanded by merging institutions 
with complimentary rather than duplicative curriculum. For public 
institutions, the elimination of duplication to save money may be 
major reasons for merger, especially if they are in proximity to each 
other. Quality and access can also be enhanced by a merger. In the 
latter case, however, the loss of identity for black colleges may be a 
major obstacle. 
Although mergers usually accomplish their intended purposes, 
especially in cases of financial exigency on the part of one partner, 
alternatives should be considered given the complexity, risks and 
negative impacts of the process. They include internal 
management changes and reforms, changes in mission and type of 
control, voluntary cooperation with other institutions, consortia, 
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federation and bankruptcy. For some institutions with severe financial 
problems, closure may be the only option. 
The literature, however, does not provide answers to several 
important questions concerning the merger phenomenon. Exactly how 
does organizational change affect the reasons, process and outcomes 
associated with a merger? What are the specific causes of conflict and 
crisis characteristic of the merger process? And finally, are there 
ways in which the merger process can be facilitated to lessen the 
negative outcomes for the institution and involved individuals? An 
examination of case studies of specific mergers will help to answer 
these questions and identify important distinctions. The analysis is 
presented according to the merger reasons (Chapter 2), process 
(Chapter 3), and outcomes (Chapter 4). 
Notes 
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1 Chambers [1983] identifies two additional but less common types 
of merger: interlocking directorate and holding corporation. In 
the interlocking directorate arrangement, members of one board 
of trustees resign and are replaced by members of the board of 
another institution. This was used in the merger between 
Parson's School of Design and New School of Social Science in 
1970. In the holding corporation model, a separate board is 
created that controls the existing boards of the institutions 
involved in a merger. The existing boards continue, but with 
limited and well defined responsibilities. 
2 Some writers draw an analogy between merger and death. 
Thompson [1985] states that the reactions and attitudes 
among the constituents of an institution about to lose its 
identity are comparable to the symptoms of grief exhibited 
over the death of a human being. For O'Neill and Barnett 
[1980], the psychological impact of merger is comparable to 
death with its sequence of denial, anger, bargaining, depression 
and acceptance. West concludes that persons "associated with an 
institution facing merger or closure suffer the same symptoms of 
grief they would experience over the loss of anything important" 
[p. 28]. 
3 Bennis [1977] points out that problems surrounding change are 
not peculiar to universities. He states, "Every modern 
bureaucracy-university, government or corporation—is 
essentially alike and responds similarly to challenge and to crisis, 
with much the same explicit codes, punctilios and mystiques" 
[p. 121]. 
4 Academic mergers differ from business mergers in at least two 
important ways. Academic mergers are less restrictive in that 
there are no anti-trust laws involved and no fear of an injunction 
on the basis of restraint of trade and reduction of competition 
[Thompson, 1970]. Also, academic mergers usually involve one 
institution being in an inferior position resulting in the joining 
a viable with a non-viable institution. This is usually not the case 
in business mergers [Benezet, 1983]. 
5 Steiner [1975] also identifies threats to managerial status as a 
detriment to business mergers. Like academic mergers, he states 
that business mergers have a variety of motivations and varied 
effects. He concludes that guidelines ought to be established that 
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will enable companies to determine if a merger should be 
entered into and that attention must be given to probable 
alternatives to merger. 
6 The concern of faculty members relative to merger is articulated 
by the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). In 
a statement issued in 1981, the Association put forth two 
requirements: First, faculty should be involved in decisions 
affecting academic programs and faculty status. Second, terms of 
faculty appointment at the time of affiliation be honored as fully 
as possible and the principles of academic freedom and tenure be 
safeguarded. 
7 Public institutions operate under enabling general education 
legislation or specific statutes passed by state legislatures. 
Private institutions operate under nonprofit corporation acts of 
each state and degree approval requirements of various boards. 
Meyer [1970] points out that a merged institution must seek 
approval to grant degrees from the appropriate authority in 
the state and must follow state requirements in changing name 
and/or location of the institution. 
8 Other legal concerns concerning the technical parts of merger 
include corporate powers of governing boards, transfer of assets, 
incorporation of governing board, corporate legislative and/or 
judicial approval, labor contracts, contracts with vendors, leases, 
merger agreement document, disposition of physical property, 
and transfer of accounts receivable and payable [Meyer, 1970; 
Thompson, 1985; Chambers, 1981b]. 
9 The mergers were Suny/Buffalo, University of Missouri/Kansas 
City, New York University/Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn, 
and Lowell State College/Lowell Technological Institute. 
10 The study commission, however, concluded that mergers between 
public institutions are rare and difficult particularly if impetus 
comes from the state. 
11 They identify the retaining of savings by the institution (as 
opposed to reversion to the state) as one incentive. With this 
incentive, the desired outcomes could then be achieved on a 




He concludes that "Without this motivation for excellence, merger 
would have been much more difficult for faculty members to 
accept...[it] was a purpose faculty members could not resist" [p. 
21]. 
13 The merger of the University of Kansas City with the University of 
Missouri system, the University of Buffalo with the State 
University of New York, and the School of Engineering and Science 
of New York University with the Polytechnic Institute of 
Brooklyn are cited as examples of public institutions moving into 
urban areas through mergers. 
14 It is also possible that the mission may remove an institution 
from a consideration of merger as a viable alternative. This is 
illustrated by a recent merger attempt in Michigan. Citing its 
unique role for the people of Detroit, Marygrove College has 
recently withdrawn from a plan to merge with the University of 
Detroit and Mercy College [Marygrove Withdraws, 1990]. West 
[1980] argues that if the distinctive quality of the institution’s 
mission is declining in importance and the environmental 
setting has low potential, then closure rather than merger is 
almost inevitable. 
15 To this definition, Cannon [1983] adds arrangements where 
institutions create subcolleges within a large organization. Under 
this arrangement, the subunits share resources, lower 
operating costs and reduce areas of duplication while gaining 
greater identity and autonomy in terms of name, programs, 
faculty and facilities. The Cluster Colleges of Claremont 
College in California are an example of federation. Each college is 
autonomous, but they share many academic programs and 
facilities and have a centralized planning and coordinating 
mechanism. 
CHAPTER 2 
REASONS FOR THE MERGERS 
The literature identifies financial exigency, greater coordination, 
previous cooperation, program changes and quality improvement as 
reasons why institutions merge. By analyzing the 18 case studies 
(listed in Appendix A), it is possible to identify certain pressures on 
the institutions that underlie the reasons for a merger. For the private 
institutions, the pressures include trying to maintain a particular 
purpose in the face of changing conditions. For the public institutions, 
there is the pressure from external bodies for greater educational 
opportunity and accountability. These underlying pressures are 
identified and elaborated upon in the first two sections of this chapter, 
one dealing with private institutions and the other public institutions. 
Important distinctions are then presented when this analysis is 
compared with the literature. The chapter concludes with an 
interpretation of the findings that identifies common elements and a 
fundamental tension between forces for change and stability. 
Financial Exigency in the Private Sector 
Seven of the mergers studied involved private institutions. In all 
cases, one of the partners faced financial exigency so severe that a 
merger was the only viable alternative to closing. 1 In addition to 
being private institutions, each college shared other characteristics— 
low enrollment, limited programs, small endowments and management 
difficulties—all of which contributed to their financial predicament. 
The case of Milwaukee-Downer College is typical of the others and will 
be briefly described to illustrate the crisis and the causative factors 
that led to merger. 
Milwaukee-Downer College was a small liberal arts institution 
for women that was experiencing serious financial difficulty for a 
number of years. Over those years, the college incurred increasing 
deficits due mainly to declining enrollments. The loss of students was 
primarily due to the college's steadfastness to remaining a liberal arts 
college and a single sex institution in spite of changing market 
demand. This situation was exacerbated by competition from a nearby 
rapidly expanding public institution, the University of Wisconsin- 
Milwaukee. The main response of the president and trustees to 
mounting problems was to change admission plans and staff and to 
increase fund-raising activities. When these attempts failed to solve 
the problem and the college's small endowment was being eroded, the 
trustees faced a major financial crisis. Rejecting the alternatives of 
coeducation and interinstitutional cooperation with the nearby public 
university, the trustees decided to sell its property to the public 
university and merge with another private institution in order to 
avoid dissolution. 
The situation of the other six private institutions involved in this 
study is much the same. Names, places and some details change, but 
the central theme of financial stress resulting mainly from low 
enrollment remains the same. In analyzing the data of these mergers, 
two additional significant factors stand out. The first factor involves 
problems within the administrative sphere. In most cases, fiscal 
management and decision making left something to be desired. At 
Milwaukee-Downer, the trustees did not exercise budget authority to 
avoid deficits [Howard, 1980]. This was also true at Parsons School of 
Design where Levy [1979] describes the trustees as sanguine 
concerning deficits and concludes that rudimentary principles of 
management and solutions to financial problems seem to have been 
ignored. Management problems at Barrington College took the form of 
a leadership vacuum created by five different chief executive officers 
in a span of seven years prior to merger [Winfrey, 1989]. Detroit 
College of Business was denied accreditation just prior to seeking 
merger because its planning process was not continuous nor related to 
budgeting procedures [Brown, 1987]. 
A second significant factor which led these private institutions to 
merger was the presence of a steadfastness of purpose. This took 
different forms at the various colleges. For Barrington College and 
Western College, it manifested itself in faith in the deity to deliver 
these quasi-church related institutions from their financial difficulties 
so that their specialized mission could continue. New College and 
Milwaukee-Downer College consistently refused to change their high 
cost, low demand program in order to continue their special 
contribution to higher education. Parsons School of Design rejected 
establishing a Bachelor of Fine Arts until it was too late to save itself 
financially because the program might dilute its current curricula. In 
the end, all seven institutions selected merger over dissolution in 
order to try to continue their heritage and specialized mission. This is 
made very clear in the Barrington College merger where Winfrey 
[1989] concludes: 
Certainly if Barrington could find another institution of 
a similar philosophy willing to enter into a merger 
agreement, then the mission of the college could continue 
to be fulfilled. Indeed, closing the college would have meant 
that Barrington's mission would have ceased to exist as an 
option for like-minded individuals considering attendance at a 
higher education institution, [pp. 251-52] 
There is a certain irony that the very steadfastness which 
contributed to financial difficulty became the motivation to accept a 
merger and reject dissolution. This steadfastness of purpose will also 
play a role in the process of merger to be discussed in Chapter 3. The 
question of whether these institutions were successful in perpetuating 
their mission will be examined in Chapter 4. 
In some of the cases, internal financial problems were 
exacerbated by external forces over which the institution had no 
control. Competition for students brought about by rapidly expanding 
public institutions in the same locality as small private institutions 
contributed to the decline in enrollment driven revenues for at least 
two institutions involved in this study. For Milwaukee-Downer 
College, the nearby University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee with its lower 
cost and program variety seriously competed for students and eroded 
the college's local base, forcing it to seek out-of-state students. For 
Owen College, the impact of the expansion of the Tennessee community 
college system was more pronounced. The president of Owen is 
quoted as succinctly describing the expansion as "the death knell of 
Owen College, because we will not be able to compete...at the 
operational level or at the capital level" [Searcy, 1981, p. 54]. 
Given the very grave financial condition of these seven colleges, 
why would any other institution enter into a merger with them? Two 
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case studies may give some insight on this question. New School of 
Social Research, a private liberal arts institution, was sought as a 
merger partner for the troubled Parsons School of Design. Although 
Parsons had no endowment, owned no buildings and possessed 
insufficient funds to finish the fiscal year, New School agreed to a 
merger. The administration of New School was in an expansion mode 
and viewed merger with Parsons as an opportunity to expand its 
educational and philosophical position, to become larger for optimum 
size for administrative efficiency and to diversify its programs to 
counter changing market trends [Levy, 1979]. Levy concluded that 
New School officials determined that Parsons' problems were 
administrative, not educational, and could be solved by tuition 
increase, cost reduction through consolidation, and increased 
fund-raising from professional and industrial ties which New 
School did not have. The attractiveness of Parsons is underscored by 
New School's rejection about the same time of a merger offer from 
Mills College of Education. The administration of New School judged 
Mills to be not viable financially nor educationally [Levy]. Clearly New 
School saw a financial gain in incorporating Parsons' programs into its 
offerings. 
A similar gain was the motivation for Miami University (Ohio), a 
public institution, to take over nearby Western College, a private 
institution in severe financial difficulty. According to an analysis by 
Kennedy [1975], Miami saw an opportunity to increase its book value 
by obtaining Western's land and buildings at a bargain price. It feared 
that if Western went into bankruptcy, its land would be put to 
undesirable use. Also, the merger would generate additional revenue 
from the state and students. Aside from direct financial gain, it was 
thought that Miami's national reputation would be enhanced by 
providing a model for the taking over a small liberal arts college. The 
only educational gain identified by Kennedy was that Miami would 
diversify its curriculum by incorporating a program for testing 
innovative ideas. For Miami, the main gain was directly financial. 
Further insight on why an institution would enter into a merger 
with a troubled institution can be gained from a study conducted 
by Deubell [1984]. Based on a survey of educational leaders, he 
concluded that few problems will deter merger on the part of a 
healthier institution when it recognizes that a long-term need will be 
met and a type of economy will be gained. The existence of high fixed 
cost was identified as a major impediment to a merger. Of the 
fourteen major impediments identified by the respondents, eleven 
dealt with economic factors.2 The remaining three issues dealt with 
quality (accreditation, image and retrenchment affecting quality). The 
financial factors which create problems for an institution may very 
well hinder its efforts to obtain a satisfactory remedy through a 
merger. 
Public Policy Issues in the Public Sector 
In examining the case studies of the mergers of public 
institutions, it is clear that the reasons for merger are far more 
complex than the financial exigency that propelled the mergers of 
private institutions. Part of the reason for this is the added 
involvement of coordinating boards, legislators and governors in the 
decision-making process. The political system within which public 
institutions operate contributes an extra dimension that private 
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institutions do not have to contend with. Even though public and 
private institutions share the common educational goal of the 
advancement and dissemination of knowledge through instruction and 
research, how they administer the process differs greatly. Public 
policy addressing issues of educational opportunity, efficiency and 
accountability which influences public institutions is in sharp contrast 
to the independence of action afforded trustees and presidents of 
private institutions. The ultimate locus of control for a public 
institution is external to the campus, whereas in the private sector it is 
internal to the institution. 
Public policy issues certainly played a pivotal role in effectuating 
the mergers of public institutions examined in this study.3 The desire 
of public officials, external to the institution, to increase efficiency and 
expand educational opportunity by merging public institutions is 
distinctly different than the merger motives of private institutions 
facing financial exigency. A description of the much studied merger 
creating the University of Wisconsin System [Carothers, 1974; Heim, 
1976; and Buchanan, 1977] is presented to illustrate the role of public 
officials and their use of a merger to attain both efficiency and 
expanded educational opportunity. 
Prior to 1971, Wisconsin had two separate university systems-- 
the University of Wisconsin system and the State University of 
Wisconsin system. Each system had its own board of trustees and 
a number of campuses located throughout the state. During the 
period 1897-1969, merger bills were introduced in 23 of the 38 
legislative sessions held during that period [Carothers, 1974]. 
The only two bills to pass created a coordinating board and staff 
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with limited powers. The pattern of external political involvement 
was well established when newly elected Governor Patrick Lucey filed 
legislation in 1970 to merge the two systems. In introducing the 
legislation, Lucey focused on efficiency and egalitarian aspects of 
educational opportunity [Heim, 1976]. The efficiency to be gained 
from merger would be the limiting of unchecked competition between 
the two systems and the saving of administrative funds by 
consolidating three boards and staffs into one [Heim]. The governor's 
emphasis was not so much on saving money but on the maximum 
utilization of funds to ensure the highest quality [Carothers]. This led 
to his other stated motivation to end the inequities in funding between 
the two systems and to abolish the discrimination between the two 
degrees [Carothers]. The first objective actually stated in the bill 
dwells on this egalitarian aspect: "A unified system of collegiate 
education will foster greater diversity in educational opportunity..." 
[Buchanan, 1977, p. 2]. 
To understand why a merger would redress the problems of 
inefficiency and inequity, the causative factors need to be examined. 
Certainly the rapid growth of both systems with new campuses being 
added during the period 1950-70 led to competition and duplication 
[Buchanan, 1977]. As indicated by Buchanan, every four-year 
institution in the state wanted to be like the University of Wisconsin- 
Madison. She described the two systems as having a "long history of 
internecine warfare" [p. 1]. In an attempt to control this situation, 
elected officials created a coordinating board several years before 
merger took place. This action failed to solve the problem because the 
board had no real power to enforce decisions, no constituency, and a 
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membership drawn from the two systems [Buchanan, 1977]. Faced 
with continuing rivalry and spiraling costs, elected officials turned to 
merger as a solution to inefficiency and inequity. 
All three case studies on the Wisconsin merger clearly indicate 
that the governor provided the impetus for the merger proposal. With 
the merger proposal coming from an external source, what was the 
reaction from the higher education community? Carothers [1974] 
reported that most of the higher education establishment was against 
merger. He identified the concern of opponents that the merger would 
homogenize the system by leveling peaks of excellence and destroying 
diversity. The University of Wisconsin-Madison faculty feared the 
deterioration of quality, loss of prestige and faculty control, and 
infringement of academic freedom. Opponents within the State 
University system claimed that the merger would lead to a 
deterioration of teaching excellence within the system. The loss of 
special missions of individual campuses and local autonomy were also 
identified as concerns. 
Given this division of the governor proposing the merger in the 
name of equal opportunity and efficiency and the higher education 
establishment opposing it on the grounds of autonomy and excellence, 
the legislature was faced with the final decision. Would it vote the 
merger down as it had done so many times before? Heim [1976] in his 
detailed study of the legislative deliberations on the issue sheds some 
light on why the merger bill passed. First and foremost he credits the 
governor's initiative, perseverance and judicious use of power and 
influence as a key reason for passage of the bill. Members of the 
legislature saw the merger as a way to eliminate dickering between 
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the two systems, to lessen competition and the lobbying for funds, and 
to establish better legislative control. Their displeasure with the 
performance of the coordinating board was also a factor favoring the 
merger. 
Circumstances in the state and on the campuses also created a 
favorable environment for the merger in the minds of the legislators. 
Heim [1976] maintains that conservatives did not like the University 
of Wisconsin-Madison because of the riots, demonstrations and 
permissive attitudes toward radicalism. Carothers [1974] identifies a 
commitment to, and emphasis on, austerity coupled with rapidly rising 
budget requests as contributing strongly to merger. He also cited the 
pragmatic reality that campus unrest cost the University of Wisconsin 
political clout and public support. Because of little public interest in 
the merger, he concludes that the issue was of little interest to 
legislators. Passage of the merger bill would not raise the general 
public's ire. Buchanan [1977] found general public indifference to the 
specific issue of merger, but a desire on the part of citizens to save 
money. Perhaps this influenced Governor Lucey's statement at the 
passage of the implementation bill that the merger not only meant 
better education but savings for each taxpayer. 
Further insight on the dichotomous relationship between 
external and internal positions on merger of public institutions 
can be gained from Zekan's study [1990] of four mergers that took 
place in Massachusetts.^ In the Southeastern Massachusetts 
merger, the then Governor Foster Furcolo wanted the merger, 
according to Zekan, in order to provide greater educational opportunity 
and increased access in a neglected area of the state. The two 
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institutions to be merged opposed the legislation, favoring instead 
individual expansion. Likewise in the Lowell merger, neither 
institution vigorously supported the merger proposed by a local 
legislator. The goal, as stated in the merger bill introduced by the 
legislator, was to expand educational opportunity. In the Boston State 
and UMass, Boston merger which was opposed by both institutions, 
especially the former, the legislature and governor were the prime 
movers. The motivation for the merger on the part of these elected 
officials was the diminished reputation of and declining enrollment at 
Boston State, state revenue problems, a desire for greater efficiency, 
and the elimination of program redundancy. The impetus for the Blue 
Hills/Massasoit merger came from the local communities which funded 
Blue Hills. Due to tax ceiling legislation, these communities could not 
afford continued funding. 
In analyzing these mergers, Zekan [1990] concluded that public 
policy and not institutional primacy was the major impetus. He points 
out that the merger of public institutions creates a situation where 
issues of institutional autonomy and public policy meet. In the four 
mergers he studied, the desire to advance the standing of public 
higher education by providing greater educational opportunity as 
defined by elected public officials prevailed over the accommodation 
of individual concerns of the various institutions. With the exception 
of the Blue Hills situation, he further states that financial consideration 
was not a direct cause but rather an opportunity to enact public policy. 
This certainly is in sharp contrast to the role that financial exigency 
plays in the merger of private institutions discussed in the beginning 
of this chapter. 
From Zekan's [1990] analysis, one could conclude that the public 
officials possessed the high ground of espousing access and expanded 
educational opportunity for the citizens of state in contrast to the 
parochial and self-serving position of the institutions. This certainly is 
a role reversal of how many educational officials view their stance on 
issues in general. The motivations of public officials, however, need 
additional examination. Returning to the studies conducted on the 
Wisconsin merger, evidence of possible other motivations on the part 
of public officials may be found. Some observers claimed that 
Governor Lucey proposed the merger to divert attention from a 
taxation issue, to help win re-election, or to gain immediate control 
over the governing board by new appointments. Legislators were 
interested in the merger in order to increase legislative control and to 
eliminate competing lobbying efforts [Heim, 1976]. For elected 
officials, it is quite possible that increased educational opportunity and 
efficiency sought through a merger are euphemisms for increased 
control and the self-serving motive to remain in office. It may very 
well be a case of public policy tempered by power principles and pure 
political pragmatism. 
The theme of public policy considerations and impetus for a 
merger from elected officials is also found in consolidation efforts in 
Washington, D.C., Arkansas, and Oregon.^ The Congress of the United 
States played a major role in merging three institutions in the nation's 
capital [Dilworth, 1981]. Cited reasons for the merger included a low 
level of cooperation, a need for coordination, elimination of program 
duplication, anticipated financial stress and equal educational 
opportunity. In Arkansas, the legislature initiated and passed merger 
legislation creating the University of Arkansas at Pine Bluff without 
consulting the institution [Neal, 1978]. The stated reason was to 
streamline budget procedures and restore the institution to financial 
solvency. The merger of schools of education in the Oregon system 
was the direct result of political pressure from the state legislature 
because of revenue reduction [McMahon, 1984]. 
Another example of public policy issues playing a significant 
role was the proposed merger that did not take place between the 
University of Maryland Eastern Shore and Salisbury State College. 
Both institutions are publicly supported, located 12 miles apart and 
offer basically the same programs. Salisbury was much smaller and 
had a predominately white student body. Eastern Shore was a 
predominately black institution. Proponents for the merger held that 
it would expand and diversify educational opportunity, be more 
economically efficient and result in a biracially constituted institution. 
In his study of the proposal, Richardson [1976] concluded that the 
merger would not yield significant savings or a lower cost per student. 
Economies of scale would not take place because both campuses would 
still have to be operated resulting in few fixed cost items being 
eliminated. Richardson suggests that although the merger would 
eliminate program duplication and provide greater breadth, depth and 
diversity in the curriculum, cooperative arrangements could produce 
the same results. Using the merger to accomplish the public policy 
objective of desegregation is also questioned by Richardson. The 
merger would mean the dissolution of Eastern Shore as a black 
institution with the possible resulting loss of a supportive environment 
for minorities in the state. 
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Within the group of public mergers studied, there is an exception 
to the pattern of external public policy impetus. A study by Greider 
[1988] of the merger of three municipal institutions with their 
respective state systems reveals that financial stress was the impetus 
for these institutions to seek a merger.^ In each case the local 
municipality had too small a tax base to support the institution. 
Although his case study dealt with only three of these mergers, he 
reported that 14 out of a total of 15 municipal institutions became part 
of state systems between 1962 and 1985. In his case studies of the 
three, the institutions viewed a merger as the only solution to funding 
problems. Even though the representatives of these institutions 
were emotionally against a merger and realized the loss of autonomy 
in administrative matters, • pragmatically they realized their survival 
required it. In this regard, these mergers are more similar to the 
merger of the private institutions in this study than to those of the 
public institutions. It is also interesting to note that in all three 
mergers, the local community was in favor of the merger because of 
the prospect of tax relief. 
Comparison with the Literature 
A significant difference that emerges when the reasons for the 
mergers in this study are compared with the literature is the sharp 
distinction which exists between the motivation for the mergers of 
public and private institutions. In the literature, this distinction is not 
always evident or addressed. Although mergers in both spheres result 
from severe pressure, this study indicates that the mergers of public 
institutions resulted from external public policy decisions to expand 
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opportunity and increase efficiency, whereas in the private sector, the 
reason was financial exigency due to internal problems. 
What little attention is given in the literature to the reasons for 
the mergers of public institutions usually addresses financial issues 
tied to the lack of coordination between institutions. This study finds 
that public policy initiatives are a cause of public mergers. The failure 
of coordinating boards and institutions to effectuate efficiency, 
eliminate duplication and establish accountability has contributed to 
the initiation of the mergers by public officials. The desire of elected 
officials to expand educational opportunity for their constituencies and 
to gain more control over the educational enterprise has also played 
a role. Of course, the practical political consideration of staying in 
office and power enhancement have also probably been present. 
In the literature, the support of a merger by the governor of 
the state has been identified as an important and pivotal factor in 
effectuating merger. This study not only substantiates that contention, 
but indicates the significant role played by governors in initiating the 
merger proposals. This key role of the state's chief executive was 
illustrated in the mergers that took place in Wisconsin and 
Massachusetts. The role of constituent groups in mergers has also 
been identified in the literature. One prediction concerning 
constituents may have to be modified. Some claim that the mergers of 
public institutions may be rare because constituents will go to an 
extreme to stop them, thus making the political cost too high. In the 
Wisconsin and Massachusetts mergers, several factors were present 
that either overcame strong opposition or prevented it from forming. 
These factors included public reaction to high taxes, economic 
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downturn, disenchantment with actions of faculty and students, and 
the desire to attain a greater common good. It is also possible that the 
reduction in state funding for public institutions, a public policy act, 
could force institutions to initiate mergers on their own in order to 
enhance their standing and funding. This approach would definitely 
diminish the possibility of constituent groups blocking the merger. It 
is possible that a merger could produce a larger and more powerful 
lobbying group of citizens and politicians for the combined institution. 
One area where constituent groups may in fact be very active in 
blocking a merger is in those states where it may be used to integrate 
campuses. The literature indicates that courts have ruled that merger 
is a viable strategy to accomplish desegregation. In the case study of 
the proposed Maryland merger, evidence is presented that blacks may 
be opposed to losing their identity with an institution especially when 
benefits can be obtained through other means, such as institutional 
cooperation. 
For private institutions, this study substantiates the contention in 
the literature that financial exigency is the essential motivation for a 
merger. In each case study, the merger was consummated as the only 
alternative to closure. It allowed trustees to salvage their 
responsibility to continue educational services and opportunities. This 
study also documents the literature's causative factors leading to a 
financial difficulty. They included small size, lack of economy of scale, 
little or no endowment, enrollment decline and poor management. The 
study goes beyond these findings by identifying the characteristic of 
steadfastness as apparently underlying the causative factors leading to 
a merger and the choice of a merger over closure. This inability to 
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change and adapt takes the form of trying to preserve the heritage of 
an institution and its specialized mission. 
In the literature, geographical location, previous cooperation, 
program changes and quality improvement were identified as 
contributing factors to a merger. The analysis of the case studies 
indicates that these factors were secondary and played a limited role. 
Most of the institutions sought a merger partner within close 
proximity which would allow for the continuation of their programs 
and/or special mission, with the latter consideration being more 
important. This was illustrated by Milwaukee-Downer choosing to 
merge with another private institution rather than with the public one 
that abutted its campus. In some of the mergers, quality improvement 
was mentioned, but usually in the context of making the merger more 
palatable for faculty, students and other constituent groups. In the 
cases studied, previous cooperation was either non-existent or limited 
and not a major factor. 
There is little mention in the literature of the reasons why 
an institution would merge with one that is experiencing financial 
difficulty. The general position put forth in the literature is that there 
must be an enormous advantage for the stronger institution to accept a 
troubled partner. This study gives further insight to the reasons. In 
examining the cases, financial gain appears to be the significant 
advantage for the stronger partner. It takes many different forms. 
For some, it involves the expansion of complementary programs for a 
stronger market position. For others, it is an opportunity to expand 
facilities at bargain prices. For still others, it is an opportunity to 
lessen competition, eliminate duplication and increase revenue as a 
result of a larger enrollment. 
The conventional wisdom stated in the literature is that two 
troubled institutions should not merge. The reasoning is that this 
would only compound the problems and lead to the failure of the 
merged institution. Two case studies present exceptions to this rule. 
In the Barrington/Gordon merger, Barrington College was in a difficult 
financial position. Although Gordon was in a better position and 
operating with small surpluses, it shared some of the same factors 
contributing to Barrington's problems. The merged institution, 
however, is a viable entity 6 years later. In a similar matchup, Owen 
College and Lemoyne College both had financial difficulty. Their 
tenuous financial status, both present and future, was the critical force 
behind the merger. The combining of their assets has resulted in an 
institution which is still in existence 23 years after the merger. 
The literature also indicates that institutions with complementary 
rather than duplicate programs are better suited to be merger 
partners. Two mergers in this study, however, illustrate the feasibility 
and viability of merging similar institutions. Both Barrington College 
and Gordon College shared a common heritage and mission but with a 
degree of program differentiation. The program differentiation was 
actually viewed as an impediment by Gordon, the stronger of the two 
institutions. The merger, however, provided an opportunity to attain 
an economy of scale and establish a financially stable Christian college 
in the face of financial realities and demographic forecasts [Winfrey, 
1989]. For two very similar business colleges in Michigan, Detroit 
College of Business and Davenport College, a merger provided an 
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opportunity to eliminate competition for students, to consolidate 
admissions and other services and to strengthen financial stability. 
The merger also united under one administration, campuses located in 
the eastern and western parts of the state. 
Merger Motives Interpreted 
As described in this chapter, the decisions to enter the mergers 
were made for pragmatic reasons by individuals and groups in 
positions of authority. For the private institutions, the main motive of 
presidents and trustees was to alleviate financial exigency. In the 
public sector, the principal reasons were to increase educational 
opportunity, accountability and efficiency as defined by various 
government officials external to the institutions. 
The merger decisions can also be viewed as being made by the 
hierarchy of a bureaucratic organization. The decisions were based on 
facts and purely objective considerations as viewed by the hierarchy. 
For the private institutions, the hierarchy determined that the 
financial situation was such that the organization could not continue to 
survive as presently constituted. Based on financial reports supplied 
by senior financial administrators or consultants, the rational solution 
was to either close or try to continue some vestige of their tradition 
through a merger with another institution. In the cases involving 
public institutions, the governmental hierarchy made judgments based 
on reports/studies or personal conviction as to the need to expand 
educational opportunity for social, political and economic reasons 
and/or to increase efficiency in the face of declining state revenues. 
The decision of the hierarchy to enter a merger committed the 
institutions in this study to probably the most drastic change in their 
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histories. Their decision brought to the fore a fundamental tension 
that exists in organizations. According to Lewin [1952], there exists 
forces for change and forces for stability and equilibrium within any 
system. In examining the motives for the mergers considered in this 
study, this tension between change and stability manifested itself in 
different ways. 
For the private institutions, there existed the tension between the 
administration’s steadfastness in maintaining a tradition on the one 
hand and the rapidly shrinking financial resources resulting from 
enrollment decline and other environmental factors that warranted 
fundamental change on the other. For the public institutions, the 
tension was between external public policy initiatives to increase 
opportunity and efficiency as opposed to the internal community's 
desire to maintain traditional academic pursuits. This is a classic 
example of the public's desire for change conflicting with traditional 
academic interests. Within this context, both the public and private 
institutions involved in the mergers found themselves reacting to 
change rather than actively managing or directing the tension between 
the two fundamental forces. This will be addressed in more detail in 
the final chapter. 
Although the findings in this chapter present different reasons 
why public and private institutions merged, they do share some 
commonality. Bolman and Deal [1984] state that in the political 
perspective, organizations are viewed as "arenas of scarce resources 
where power and influence are constantly affecting the allocation of 
resources among individuals or groups" [p. 5], This approach holds 
that organizational change is always political in that it involves the 
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pursuit of self-interest and power. The political elements of power, 
self-interest and scarce resources were all present as motives in the 
mergers studied. 
In the mergers involving both public and private institutions, the 
use of power was evident. The dominant group in the mergers 
involving private institutions, trustees and presidents, used their 
positions and fiduciary responsibility in reaching the decision to 
merge. In the public sector, government officials exercised their 
power of control over the educational enterprise. In both 
instances, the authorities had access to the power of position in 
reaching the decision to merge. From a political perspective, these 
groups are only one of many contenders for power. As the process of 
merger unfolds, other constituent groups seeking power will emerge. 
This will be discussed in the next chapter. 
In examining the motivations for the mergers in this study, a 
second element of the political perspective, the pursuit of institutional 
self-interest, is clearly present for both private and public institutions. 
For the private institutions experiencing financial difficulty, a merger 
was viewed as a way of perpetuating their heritage and specialized 
purpose. Self-preservation, albeit through a merger, is a fundamental 
manifestation of institutional self-interest. The dominant role of self- 
interest is also clearly evident in the motivation of the stronger 
partner in agreeing to enter a merger with a financially troubled 
institution. Financial gain resulting from acquiring students, programs 
or property at bargain prices is a strong motivational factor to promote 
an institution's self-interest. People who run institutions often find it 
difficult to pass up an opportunity to improve the institution's 
financial position with a minimum investment. 
In the mergers involving public institutions, self-interest 
manifests itself in a different way. In these mergers, the public policy 
initiative to increase educational opportunity and efficiency is 
contrasted with the individual institution's interest in preserving 
traditional academic values. The former group is motivated by 
pragmatic social, economic and political considerations. The latter 
group owes a particular loyalty to autonomy and academic disciplines 
and is motivated by the professional goal of the advancement of 
knowledge. In both instances, self-preservation plays a central role. 
For the politician, the fundamental truism is that to exercise power, 
one must continue to be elected. For the faculty member, one must 
publish for professional recognition and advancement. 
A third major characteristic of the political view of organizations 
is the existence of scarce resources. The seven private institutions in 
this study were certainly motivated to consider merger because of 
financial exigency brought on by declining enrollments and other 
factors. The use of the merger alternative by government officials in 
the public sector to increase efficiency was certainly motivated in part 
by concern over the allocation of limited or declining state revenues. 
From the political perspective then, the motivation for these 
mergers was to promote or protect institutional self-interest. Within 
this interpretation, the existence of scarce financial resources created 
the crisis that was the catalyst for the hierarchy to exercise its power 
to move the organization toward a merger. Some organizational 
theorists hold that crisis unfreezes an organization so that change can 
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take place. The degree to which these organizations were unfrozen 
and the congruency between the merger process and the political 
perspective will be examined in the next chapter. 
Summary 
The private and public institutions involved in this study entered 
their mergers for different reasons. For the private institutions, financial 
exigency exacerbated by management problems was the reason. For the 
public institutions, public policy concerns of expanded opportunity and 
accountability, as viewed by governmental entities external to the 
institutions, were the primary reasons. This distinction is not readily 
apparent in the literature. Also, exceptions to the conventional wisdom 
that two financially troubled institutions or those with similar programs 
should not merge have been presented. 
The motivation of decision makers in both public and private sectors, 
however, share some common characteristics. In both categories, the 
decision makers, individuals and groups at the upper level of the 
organizational hierarchy, were confronted with the classic tension 
between forces for change and the forces to maintain the status quo 
within the organization. For the private institutions, this manifested itself 
in the desire to maintain traditional mission and programs in the face of 
shrinking resources. For the public institutions, the tension took the form 
of meeting external policy needs versus maintaining traditional academic 
interest. 
From a political perspective, other common characteristics in decision 
making were identified. In both categories, the decision makers made 
use of the power of their positions in reaching the merger decision. The 
pursuit of self-interest was also present in both categories. In the private 
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sector, it took the form of the weaker partner seeking to perpetuate its 
tradition and the stronger partner seeking financial gain. In the public 
sector, the external entities were motivated by pragmatic social, economic 
and political considerations and the internal constituencies were 
motivated by professional academic concerns. Finally, scarce resources 
played a role in the decision making in both categories. 
In the next chapter, the process that was utilized to consummate 
these mergers will be analyzed. The impact on the process of the 
forces and factors identified in this chapter will also be examined. 
Notes 
The mergers involving private institutions included in this study 
are: 
1. Barrington College and Gordon College (1985). 
2. Milwaukee-Downer College and Lawrence College 
(1964). 
3. Detroit College of Business and Davenport College (1985). 
4. Owen College and Lemoyne College (1981). 
5. Parsons School of Design and New School of Social 
Research (1970). 
6. Western College and Miami (Ohio) University (1974). 
7. New College and University of South Florida (1975). 
The major impediments to merger identified by Deubell [1984, 
pp. 95-6] are in order of importance: 
1. Declining enrollment and a high-tenured, middle-aged 
faculty. 
2. Loss of accreditation. 
3. Too many fixed-cost obligations, or adding new ones in 
the face of declining enrollments. 
4. Deterioration of surrounding urban areas making campus 
less desirable. 
5. Resident college in an isolated rural location without a 
strong image. 
6. Antiquated and expensive physical plant, making it 
difficult to move good programs. 
7. Non-existent or low level of reserves and endowment. 
8. Repeated use of reserves for operating expenses. 
9. Except for "elite" institutions, private tuition that exceeds 
nearby public college by more than $3,000 annually. 
10. Inability to strengthen institutional image or carve out a 
new one. 
11. Inability to raise tuition comparable to the cost of living 
for three conservative years. 
12. Inability to make any principal payments on federally- 
financed buildings. 
13. Retrenchment with quality deterioration. 
14. Inability to reduce employment coincident with 
enrollment decline. 
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3 The mergers of public institutions included in this study are: 
1. The University of Wisconsin System (1971). 
2. Bradford Durfee College of Technology and New Bedford 
Institute of Technology into Southeastern Massachusetts 
University (1964). 
3. Lowell State College and Lowell Technological Institute 
into University of Lowell (1975). 
4. Boston State College into the University of Massachusetts 
at Boston (1982). 
5. Blue Hills Technical Institute into Massasoit Community 
College (1985). 
6. District of Columbia Teachers College, Federal City 
College and Washington Technical Institute into the 
University of the District of Columbia (1974). 
7. Arkansas Agricultural, Mechanical and Normal College 
into the University of Arkansas at Pine Bluff (1972). 
8. Proposed merger of Salisbury State with University of 
Maryland Eastern Shore (1976). 
9. School of Education Oregon State University with the 
Division of Education Western Oregon State College 
(1982). 
10. University of Louisville into state system (1970). 
11. University of Omaha into University of Nebraska at 
Omaha (1968). 
12. Wichita University into Wichita State University (1964). 
13. Two unnamed public institutions (1975). 
4 The four Massachusetts mergers are listed in Note 3, numbers 
2, 3, 4 and 5. 
5 The institutions involved in merger from these areas are listed 
in Note 3, numbers 6, 7 and 9. 
6 The three municipal institutions are listed in Note 3, numbers 
10, 11 and 12. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE MERGER PROCESS 
Based on the analysis of the case studies, the merger process 
moves along a continuum from the decision to seek a merger to the 
negotiation of specific issues leading up to the actual merger 
agreement. Typically these issues include the transferring of 
programs, employees, students and assets as well as preserving in 
some form the identity and heritage of the partners. 
This chapter will focus on the various tensions that affect the 
process as institutions move from initiation to the final merger agree¬ 
ment. During this process, the dominance of one partner over the 
other will be presented as a significant factor affecting the merger. 
How the dominate-subordinate roles during the process are related to 
the reasons for the merger of institutions will also be examined. 
Findings concerning how consultation, conflict resolution, organi¬ 
zational structure, planning, leadership and legal considerations affect 
the process will also be presented. They will be compared throughout 
the chapter with the literature. The chapter concludes with 
interpretations of the process from a political perspective that 
provides an explanation of the documented conflict. 
The Dominance Factor 
In the previous chapter, the clear distinction that exists between 
the reasons for merging public and private institutions was identified 
as a major finding. In examining the process utilized to effectuate 
these mergers, a common characteristic emerges that has no 
relationship to the private/public status of the institutions involved. 
The pattern of one partner playing a dominant role in the process was 
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present in mergers between private institutions, public institutions 
and the combination of the two. This dominance by the stronger 
partner played an important role in the negotiation between 
institutions leading up to the consummation of the merger agreement. 
One case will be described to illustrate the various ways that this 
phenomenon affects the process. 
Western College sought a merger with Miami University to solve 
financial problems and to continue its identity as a residential college 
of Miami. At the outset of negotiations, the faculty of Western was 
euphoric with the prospect of continuing the college identity and their 
own employment through a merger [Kennedy, 1975]. Their euphoria 
was short-lived. From the outset, Miami resisted the incorporation of 
Western faculty and questioned the viability of its program. In a 
memorandum of understanding outlining general points approved by 
both governing boards, Miami made no commitment to continue 
faculty, staff or programs of Western after a transitional year. 
Although the terms of this memorandum clearly favored Miami, 
Kennedy reported that the president of Western had faith in the 
president of Miami that future negotiations would be favorable to 
Western. The fact that Western was in a deep financial crisis most 
likely played a principal role in its board accepting the initial terms 
favorable to Miami. 
Following the memorandum of understanding, Miami's dominance 
continued when it unilaterally requested input from its community 
on how best to utilize Western and appointed a planning committee 
which did not include any representatives from Western. This 
created tension between the two institutions, aroused antagonism 
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among Western faculty and all but ended the spirit of cooperation 
[Kennedy, 1975]. The mind-set of Miami is illustrated by comments of 
its chancellor: ’’Western is going out of business; how we use it is up to 
Miami" [p. 91]. Faculty members of Western were not included on the 
committee because of Miami's position that it would be funding the 
program and therefore Western should have no say in the matter. In 
addition, it was held that Western faculty would push for academic 
programs that Miami believed would be weak educationally and 
unsound financially. By the time the committee began to develop 
recommendations, Kennedy found that "frustration, disappointment, 
anger and animosity against Miami were prevalent attitudes among 
members of the Western community" [p. 106]. 
The planning committee's recommendation to make Western a 
liberal arts/interdisciplinary college was approved by Miami's 
senate and board of trustees. The faculty of Western was against 
the liberal arts proposal but for the interdisciplinary college 
proposal. Western trustees objected to the type of degree to be 
awarded to students in the new college and to the lack of a tenure 
provision for faculty. While Miami was debating what to do with 
Western from a program standpoint, negotiations on legal and financial 
issues were going smoothly and culminated with the selling of 
property, buildings and equipment. The transfer of programs, 
personnel and students continued to be controversial and to be 
dictated by Miami. At the conclusion of the transitional year, Miami 
decided to offer a freshman program that would bear the name 
Western. It would only give first consideration to Western faculty 
who applied for any Miami vacancies. Only a small number of faculty 
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members were hired. Miami would also accept Western students as 
transfers. Only 50 students were interested. 
What started out as a desire of Western to provide for the 
continuance of an innovative undergraduate liberal arts experience, 
ended with virtually no continuity. This resulted from the dominance 
of the process by Miami. This process is accurately described by the 
president by Western: "the whole negotiated process...as far as 
Western was concerned, moved from affiliation to acquisition" 
[Kennedy, 1975, p. 156]. How did Miami come to dominate the 
process? Certainly the fundamental factor that facilitated Miami's 
dominance was the financial condition of Western. The financial 
exigency, which drove Western to seek a merger in the first place, also 
placed it in a weak negotiating position. If any vestiges of the 
institutions were to continue, Western needed Miami more than Miami 
needed Western. Because of its weak negotiating position, Kennedy 
concluded that Western could not control merger issues, but only react 
to Miami's initiatives. 
In analyzing Western's approach to the process, additional 
factors that contributed to exacerbating its weak bargaining position 
can be identified. The strategy of dividing negotiations into two 
separate stages, legal/financial aspects first followed by program/staff 
continuation issues, seriously weaken any bargaining position it had. 
This conclusion can be supported by Kennedy's [1975] assertion that 
for Miami, Western's program and faculty were not attractive. 
Perhaps Western's leadership was lulled into the two stage approach 
by public statements from Miami's leadership. Kennedy observed that 
"the sensitivity of the negotiations process and the political 
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maneuvering necessary to achieve merger within the public sphere 
seem to create a negotiations climate where public statements can 
not be equated with true motivations" [p. 188]. 
In addition to Western's naivete as to Miami motives, the 
negotiators for Western did not employ any specialist in legal or 
merger matters in the early stages of negotiations. This was in 
contrast to Miami which had an array of specialists who 
orchestrated the process. The lack of professional help, naivete 
as to Miami's motives and, most of all, financial crisis all combined to 
place Western in a position to be dominated by Miami. The end result 
was that Western bargained away any chance of preserving some or 
all of its program and staff in exchange for one year of financial 
solvency. Based on his analysis of the merger, Kennedy [1975] draws 
two major conclusions regarding the process: leaders should recognize 
the natural adversarial position that develops during negotiations 
regardless of trust and they should assess strengths and weaknesses, 
motivations and perspectives of both parties. 
Although the other cases involving private institutions examined 
in this study do not address the merger process as extensively as the 
Miami/Western case, evidence of the financially stronger partner 
dominating the other is present in many of them. In the Parsons/New 
School merger, the board of trustees of New School, the financially 
stable partner, voted the merger with Parsons only on the condition 
that Parsons would cover its own operating deficit through fund¬ 
raising. In the Milwaukee-Downer/Lawrence College merger, the 
stronger position of Lawrence College forced Downer to accept the 
naming of a paper college for Downer rather than changing the name 
to Lawrence-Downer College. Although financially troubled, Owen 
College was able to gain a hyphenated position in the new name of 
the merged institution, LeMoyne-Owen College, due to the transferring 
of its endowment. It was not able, however, to negotiate successfully 
the transfer of its main program, business and secretarial science. All 
these examples support the contention that the buyers of financially 
distressed institutions were in a position to dominate negotiations. 
Even when negotiations took place with a spirit of mutual 
trust, the dominance by one partner was still evident. In the 
Barrington/Gordon merger, the institution in the stronger financial 
position, Gordon had the final say in determining program and faculty 
transfer. Several Barrington programs were not continued by the new 
institution and only four faculty members actually transferred to the 
new institution, located on the Gordon campus [Winfrey, 1989]. In 
addition, during the negotiations on the name of the merged 
institution, Gordon's dominant role is evident. Barrington College 
wanted a hyphenated name, Gordon-Barrington College. Gordon 
College did not. The final compromise favored Gordon and resulted in 
a cumbersome name-Gordon College: The United College of Gordon 
and Barrington. 
There is one outstanding exception to the pattern of financial 
exigency creating a weak negotiating position that results in a 
substantial loss of identity or continuity for the private institution. 
In the merger of New College with the University of South Florida, New 
College was able to continue its unique curriculum and identity by 
becoming an honors college within the University's structure. As a 
result, most faculty and students were retained [Reed, 1978]. 
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Although it was facing a financial crisis as severe as the one 
confronting Western College, New College was able to negotiate a 
unique arrangement regarding the funding of the honors college. The 
merger agreement provided for the creation of a foundation, made up 
of former New College trustees, that would raise money for the college 
over and above state appropriations. If the foundation were 
unsuccessful in raising its share of the budget, the provision of the 
merger agreement to continue the college's academic program would 
be nullified. The agreement also provided that New College faculty 
would keep their tenure only within the honors college. Although New 
College shared the same financial difficulty as other private 
institutions in this study, it avoided dominance by the stronger 
partner and was able to retain its identity and ensure its continuity 
through an innovative financial arrangement. 
In analyzing the mergers between public institutions, the 
dominance factor was also present. In contrast to financial exigency 
determining the subordinate partner in the private sector, reputation 
and power determined the dominant partner in the merger of public 
institutions. The merger of Boston State College and the University of 
Massachusetts, Boston in 1982 is a prime example. 
With the Commonwealth of Massachusetts facing financial 
difficulties, the funding of two public institutions of higher education 
within the City of Boston became a concern for legislators and the state 
board of regents. After a series of political moves, funding for public 
colleges in the Boston area was substantially reduced in the state 
budget. Prior to this funding crisis, Boston State "suffered from a 
diminished reputation and it compared poorly to the new and 
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growing" UMass, Boston [Zekan, 1990, p. 53]. When the decision was 
made by the political and educational leaders to consolidate 
institutions, the size and prestige of UMass, Boston placed it in a 
dominant position over Boston State. According to one Boston State 
leader, UMass, Boston took the position that the merger should be 
"dictated and governed by the University. UMass Boston would 
take whatever programs and personnel it wanted and needed" 
[Zekan, 1990, p. 77]. This is consistent with the remarks of a former 
president of UMass who stated that once merger became inevitable, 
"the strategy then became how to help UMass Boston come out of the 
situation stronger and to avoid those compromises that would diminish 
its stature" [Zekan, 1990, p. 73]. 
A second example of one partner dominating the other in the 
merger of public institutions is documented in Cannon's study [1977] 
of two unnamed institutions, Eastern State College and Eastern 
Technological. In this particular merger, what started out to be a 
marriage of equals, ended up with State Technological dominating the 
process. Based on a consultant's recommendation, legislation was 
passed in 1973 that mandated the merger and established a planning 
board to coordinate and implement it by 1975. Initial deliberations 
addressed issues of equality, continuity and fair representation. 
According to Cannon, Technological appeared to want a dominant role 
and State College wanted equal an role. Several actions indicate 
Technological's dominance. The newly created board for the merged 
institution appointed Technological's president as its interim president. 
Eventually, most top administrators were also from Technological. 
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Due to funding difficulties, the lower pay scale for State College faculty 
continued after the merger. The dominant role played by 
Technological can be traced to the fact that prior to the merger, it was 
larger in size and staff and had a better budget, working conditions 
and organizational structure. In the perception of the former State 
College employees, what started out as a consolidation merger actually 
ended as an acquisition by Technological. 
Another example of dominance is presented in the Wisconsin 
merger. The size and reputation of the University of Wisconsin- 
Madison enabled it to play a dominant role in the merger of the 
two university systems. During deliberations on the merger 
implementation bill, the central administration of the new system, 
composed mostly of Madison administrators, successfully lobbied for 
provisions that would not significantly alter their status or power as 
the University's primary administrative unit. According to Heim 
[1976], some of those involved thought that to tamper with the 
governing structure of the prestigious University of Wisconsin- 
Madison would ultimately lead to a decline in quality. On tenure and 
faculty status policies, the less prestigious Wisconsin State University 
lost out as the implementation bill adopted basically the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison policies. This turned the State University Faculty 
Association against the implementation bill [Buchanan, 1977]. Some 
even feared that Madison would so dominate the new system that 
campuses would be closed to support the flagship campus 
[Carothers, 1974]. Because of this fear, local autonomy and campus 
mission became main issues in the debate over the bill to implement 
this merger. These were the last strongholds for the State University 
campuses against the dominance of the more prestigious flagship 
university. 
A final example of dominance in the public sector involves 
the mergers of municipal universities with their state systems. 
When Omaha became part of the University of Nebraska system, its 
engineering department was centralized at the University of 
Nebraska-Lincoln. In addition, all administrative/budgetary 
matters had to go through Lincoln creating arguments over turf, 
funding and identity. In analyzing this merger and two other 
municipal mergers with state systems, Greider [1988] concludes 
that the urban institutions definitely developed a feeling of 
subordination to their flagship partners, producing a "stepchild" 
relationship. Prestige and power were obviously at work in these 
mergers. 
As was identified in the previous chapter, the moving forces 
for the merger of public institutions were external to the 
institutions themselves. It is interesting to note that once some 
institutions realized that their merger was a fait accompli, they 
immediately took pragmatic steps to ensure that they would 
influence or dominate the negotiations regarding implementation. 
In the Wisconsin merger, the new board of trustees worked for 
successful implementation of the merger because of a very 
pragmatic reason—the merger was going to happen [Buchanan, 
1977]. The faculty association of Wisconsin State University, 
which was originally for merger but initially against the tenure 
and status proposed in the implementation process, actively tried 
to amend provisions in its favor as the process unfolded [Heim, 
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1976]. It is also evident in the Boston State/UMass, Boston 
merger that when UMass, Boston realized that the merger was 
inevitable, it worked to gain the most advantageous position 
[Zekan, 1990]. In sharp contrast to this, however, is the position taken 
by the faculty at Boston State College. Evidently believing that the 
institution could not be closed, the faculty association opted to fight 
the merger rather than to gain some degree of control over the 
implementation of the merger with the University. By so doing, Zekan 
concludes that Boston State faculty lost an opportunity of negotiating a 
favorable settlement. 
In the literature, the dominance factor receives scant attention 
except from Chambers [1981b, 1983]. The analysis of the case studies 
certainly supports her contention that what starts out as a 
consolidation of equals usually ends as an acquisition with one 
institution dominating. This dominance translates into radical change 
for the acquired institution. It also increases the degree of conflict 
between the merging institutions. 
Conflict and Consultation 
A second significant characteristic of the merger process 
that emerged from the analysis of the case studies is the degree 
of consultation with constituent groups employed by the decision¬ 
makers at the involved institutions. It ranges from virtual secrecy 
from the faculty, students and public to extensive involvement of 
representatives of the academic community in the process. In the 
mergers involving private institutions, secrecy was employed in both 
the initiation and implementation stages. In almost all cases involving 
public institutions, varying degrees of involvement of constituent 
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groups were present in the negotiation stages leading to the 
implementation of the mergers. 
In the mergers involving private institutions, virtually all 
of them kept deliberations secretive during the initial stage of the 
process. The financial exigency facing these institutions played a role 
in their decision not to involve faculty or students in the deliberations. 
At Milwaukee-Downer College, for example, the chairperson of the 
board of trustees remarked that if faculty and students were involved, 
decisions would be "inhibited by more varied opinions...they would 
have prevented a quick decision. A matter of this sensitivity could not 
be handled by referendum" [Howard, 1980, p. 159]. All details of 
the merger in this case were agreed to by the two institutions with 
such a high degree of secrecy that when the announcement of the 
merger and its details was made to staff and students of Milwaukee- 
Downer, absolute surprise and shocked disbelief were expressed. 
Howard concluded in his study that secrecy enabled the institution to 
act expeditiously but at a price—it limited the information available to 
trustees and produced a negative effect on the college community. In 
the Parsons/New School merger, the faculty of both institutions were 
unaware of the financial crisis and uniformed concerning the merger 
negotiations. The administration of New School defended the lack of 
consultation on the grounds of time constraints and the desire to 
prevent lengthy and involved debate [Levy, 1979]. The same 
approach existed at Western and Miami during the initial negotiations 
concerning their merger. 
The fears expressed by decision-makers in the above cases are 
validated to an extent by what happened in the Barrington/Gordon 
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and LeMoyne/Owens mergers. In both of these mergers, the 
institutions involved their constituencies very early in the process. 
This did result in opposition groups forming to block the merger. At 
Barrington College, a group of alumni formed in an attempt to buy the 
campus. This led to an acrimonious debate within the Barrington 
community [Winfrey, 1989]. In the LeMoyne/Owen merger, LeMoyne 
alumni resisted the merger on the grounds that the institutions were 
not equal and would result in a loss of prestige for LeMoyne. Owen 
students demonstrated against the merger and the faculty asked that 
it be postponed [Searcy, 1981]. Despite opposition, however, both of 
these mergers were consummated. 
In contrast to the secrecy and lack of consultation that marked 
the merger of private institutions, the mergers of public institutions 
were characterized by openness and involvement of constituent 
groups during the implementation stage. Commissions, task forces and 
committees were widely utilized to negotiate issues involving the 
status of programs, staff and students. As was shown in the previous 
chapter, the impetus for merging public institutions in this study came 
from sources external to the institutions. This most likely led to the 
involvement of constituent groups in order to resolve the inevitable 
resistance and conflict that would result from an external initiative. 
The Wisconsin merger is a case in point. 
In the Wisconsin system merger, the bill that authorized the 
merger did not address any of the issues that would have to be 
resolved in order to implement the consolidation. The bill created an 
implementation committee and charged it with producing a bill that 
would effectuate a compromise among the competing demands of the 
89 
institution, legislators and individual interest groups. Membership 
consisted of representatives of governing boards, faculty, students, 
citizens and the legislature. Issues that generated the most 
controversy included faculty status for various professional groups, 
the type of tenure system, the body that would determine the mission 
of each institution, institutional status for the extension system, role of 
students in governance and relationships among institutions 
[Buchanan, 1977]. Coalitions formed around each issue. Heim [1976] 
reported that the committee structured the implementation bill that 
succeeded "through a long process of compromises and 
accommodation" [p. 47]. He concluded that the committee performed a 
difficult task in a professional non-partisan manner, which lessened 
the likelihood of any concerted opposition. 
Several other public institutions also utilized committees to 
involve constituents and to manage conflict. In the merger studied by 
Cannon [1977], a study commission, external consultants and a 
planning board to coordinate and implement the merger over a two 
year period were utilized. She posits that the planning board had no 
real authority but was established to manage conflict. The most 
extensive use of committees during the implementation stage took 
place in the University of the District of Columbia merger. A legion of 
task forces, committees and councils charged with specific 
responsibilities conducted a long series of open hearings that involved 
faculty and students. A transition committee, steering committee and 
administrative center were also established to facilitate the merger. 
Three-fourths of the respondents to a survey agreed that faculty. 
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students and administrators were involved to a great extent in 
planning and recommended the consultation procedures as being 
very useful to other institutions [Taylor, 1978]. The value of 
consultation is also illustrated in the University of Arkansas at Pine 
Bluff merger. Initially the legislature merged Arkansas A. M. & N. 
College into the university system without consultation with the 
institution. This triggered negative reactions from faculty, students, 
alumni and the black community. As a result, a new bill was passed 
which was more considerate of the institution's concerns [Neal, 1978]. 
Exactly how consultation helps to manage conflict is examined 
in depth by McMahon [1984] in his study of the merger of 
educational divisions of Oregon State University and Western 
Oregon State College. In this merger, transition teams were utilized to 
accomplish consolidation. He examined the hypothesis based on the 
organizational change theory of Zaltman and Duncan that the ability to 
resolve conflict will facilitate the transition from the initiation stage to 
the implementation stage of the merger. He found that conflict did 
exist at every level and within each group. The dominant strategy for 
resolving conflict was to bring "the issues out in the open and working 
them out among the parties involved" [pp. 122-3]. McMahon 
concluded that this strategy was a positive contribution to the 
performance of the involved departments and facilitated the 
transition from initiation to implementation of the merger. The 
use of teams also facilitated the transition by producing 
interpersonal relationships of a positive, supportive and cooperative 
nature which were perceived as helping both task completion and 
conflict resolution. This also contributed to wide-spread support on 
the part of participants for the merged structure. 
The extensive use of committees to ensure consultation does 
not automatically mean that participants will be satisfied. In 
the University of the District of Columbia merger, where participation 
in the process was high, nearly three quarters of the survey 
respondents agreed that faculty, students and administrators should 
have been involved to a greater extent in planning [Taylor, 1978]. 
Perhaps this position is linked to their perception that the trustees 
were the only decision-makers in the process and that power was not 
widely dispersed. Further support for this supposition is that although 
the majority agreed that much consultation took place with concerned 
persons, a majority also held that they had no or very little input in 
drafting consolidation and administrative procedures. When asked 
if they exerted strong influence on the decision-making process, 
a majority disagreed or were undecided. 
The Oregon merger is an excellent example of the importance 
of involvement of participants in the actual decision-making process. 
McMahon [1984] reported that groups perceived increased influence in 
decision-making due to the participation in information sharing. This 
led to increased ownership in, and commitment to, decisions which 
contributed to successful implementation. He found that the transition 
teams consisting of representatives from both institutions facilitated 
an increase in knowledge and contributed to positive attitudes. The 
teams also participated in decisions concerning the new structure. 
Participants formed the following attitudes which facilitated change: 
recognition of the need for change, openness for change, capacity to 
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accept and implement change, perceived control of decisions and 
commitment to successful change. 
The initiatiQn-impiementatiQn Continuum 
Based on the analysis of the mergers in this study, the process of 
merger moves along a continuum from initiation stages to 
implementation stages. Although the literature review indicates that 
the merger of institutions is a process, it does not identify the stages 
nor address the implications of the moving from one stage to the next. 
In the first two sections of this chapter, it has been shown that as the 
process moves along the continuum, one partner tends to dominate the 
process and conflict arises from the confrontation of competing 
demands. It has also been stated that the involvement of participants 
in the process can resolve the conflict and facilitate change. 
Are there any other factors that affect the movement from 
initiation to implementation? Based on the examination of the case 
studies, three additional factors emerge—organizational structure, 
planning and leadership. This section will discuss each of these 
factors. 
As the merger process moves from the initiation stages of 
deciding on the viability of entering into a merger to the 
implementation stages of negotiating the hard decisions, tasks of 
the participants change. McMahon [1984], in his study of the 
Oregon merger, found that certain organizational characteristics 
which facilitated the initiation of change could impede the 
implementation process. In other words, the organizational 
structure should be different for each stage. Of particular note 
was his finding that the use of transition teams working outside 
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the normal rules and procedures of the institutions provided the 
flexibility to facilitate the gathering and processing of information 
during the initiation stage. As the teams moved toward the 
implementation stage, however, formalization increased in order to 
accomplish the task and respond to demands to document change. In 
addition, the involving of faculty members in the process represented 
a decentralization during the initiation stages which facilitated 
increased communication during a period of high uncertainty and 
increased the amount of information available about the task. As the 
participants moved toward implementation, however, centralization 
increased with a more specific line of authority (administrative) in 
order to reduce role conflict or ambiguity. McMahon concluded that 
these strategies facilitated movement from initiation to 
implementation in the Oregon merger. 
In the mergers studied, the lack of planning to cope with the 
transition from initiation to implementation was evident in many 
of them. The mergers of private institutions involved a degree of 
haste that prevented careful and detailed planning. Facing financial 
exigency, there apparently was not time for deliberate planning on the 
part of these troubled institutions. In the Western/Miami merger, 
Kennedy [1975] concluded that the major financial crisis facing 
Western created intense pressure, placed them in a reactionary mode 
and precluded any pre-planning. Winfrey [1989] reported that 
complications involving the selling of a building on the Barrington 
campus and the filing of a lawsuit by students "occurred because of 
the rapid pace of events attendant with effecting a merger in such a 
short period of time" [p. 246]. 
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Evidently institutions that did not plan properly to avoid financial 
problems, were also plagued by the lack of planning during the merger 
process. 
In the mergers of public institutions, where financial exigency 
was not a factor, there are several examples of the lack of planning 
due to time constraints. Taylor [1978] in her survey of participants in 
the University of the District of Columbia merger found that one of the 
two most frequent answers to the question on how the merger process 
should have been changed was to provide adequate planning time. 
She concluded that the rapidity of the consolidation process hindered 
the merger. A possible explanation of why time is not available for 
planning can be drawn from McMahon's [1984] finding that in the 
Oregon merger, the process placed a high demand on administrative 
time to solve pragmatic problems relating to daily operations. This 
did not allow time for careful planning or evaluation. 
The Boston State/UMass, Boston merger illustrates how an 
external body, the legislature, compressed the planning time for 
the implementation of the merger. This resulted in an acrimonious 
process and personnel problems. While the board of regents and the 
two institutions were considering a consolidation plan based on the 
University of Lowell model, which would be implemented over a three 
year period, the legislature acted. In its appropriation for higher 
education, the legislative appropriation underfunded the cluster of 
colleges located in the Boston area by six million dollars [Zekan, 1990]. 
In order to cope with the underfunding, the regents accelerated the 
merger process from three years to less than one month! Subsequent 
maneuvering extended the period by several months with the final 
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date of the closing of Boston State set by the legislature. Zekan 
reported that the impact of this process was felt for years and the 
resulting legal problems involving the placement of personnel 
continued for seven years. He concluded that the manner of the 
merger’s implementation was its major failure. 
In contrast to the planning problems cited above, the 
Massasoit/Blue Hills and the Davenport/Detroit mergers present 
examples of the value of careful planning. In the Massasoit merger, 
the plan was initiated at the local level and provided for internal 
agreements on inter-institutional issues before moving to external 
agencies. This facilitated the discussion and negotiation of sensitive 
issues in an open manner. Zekan [1990] identifies the fact that the 
president of Massasoit, having been a faculty member at Boston State 
at the time of its merger with UMass, Boston, played a crucial role in 
developing an effective plan in dealing with personnel issues. The 
mistakes of that merger would be avoided in the Massasoit merger. 
The smooth initiation and implementation of this merger, however, 
may not have resulted entirely from good planning. Zekan pointed out 
the fact that the providing of state funding for all negotiated 
commitments may have contributed to the successful process. 
A more formalized planning approach to the merger of 
institutions is presented by Brown [1987]. Based on his study of 
the merger of Detroit College of Business and Davenport College, 
he concluded that a single integrated planning structure and 
formalized approach will enhance the process of merging two 
institutions by providing a disciplined approach that will force 
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them to create relationships. He also concluded that good planning 
can not occur in an environment of fear, anxiety and insecurity. 
Although formalized planning techniques, such as strategic 
planning, may be helpful, there may be resistance to them from 
within institutions. McMahon [1984] points out in his study that 
several writers claim that faculty and administrators often know 
little about planning and other management theories and techniques. 
He concluded that in higher education management and leadership, 
there is little use of laws, models and scientific values. This appears to 
be the case in many of the mergers analyzed in this study. Perhaps in 
an attempt to overcome this, some institutions turn to consultants to 
deal with the complex nature of moving from initiation to 
implementation. Aside from the use of lawyers to deal with legal 
technicalities, the use of consultants by the institutions in this study 
ranged from planning specialists in the Detroit/Davenport merger to 
financial accountants in the Parsons/New School merger. In Deubell's 
survey [1984], leading educators recommended that experts should be 
used in the merger process because the basic adversarial relationship 
between faculty and administration makes it difficult to facilitate a 
merger without assistance. Kennedy [1975] cautions, however, that 
leaders should use consultants as advisors and not as policy makers. 
The final factor which affected the process of merger is that of 
leadership. The conclusion in the literature that a strong leader 
usually controls the direction of a merger and is an important factor in 
bringing it to conclusion is upheld in many of the cases in this study. 
These leaders, however, held a variety of positions—presidents, 
governors and board chairpersons.* 
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Legal Considerations 
By its very definition, the merger of institutions has major legal 
implications. Dissolution of a corporate body, corporate structure and 
powers, fiduciary responsibilities, transfer of assets, state laws, 
contracts and restricted gifts are just some of the legal issues 
identified in the literature that must be addressed during the merger 
process. The mergers in this study presented for the most part the 
usual legal considerations identified in the literature. This section will 
present several of the unusual legal issues which arose in some of the 
mergers. 
The Barrington/Gordon merger presented several unusual legal 
situations. In the early stages of negotiation, lawyers for both 
institutions developed a proposed merger agreement. After 
representatives of both colleges reviewed the document, it was 
rejected because it contained provisions that the institution had 
not requested [Winfrey, 1989]. The representatives then got together 
and drew up a less complicated letter of intent that stressed mutual 
trust and guided all future deliberations. Later in the process, an 
oversight by attorneys for Barrington College was to blame for an 
unforeseen complication involving the sale of a gymnasium. Because 
the building was constructed with a grant from the U.S. Department of 
Education, principal and appreciation pay back was required since the 
sale took place before a stipulated time period had expired. This was 
an unexpected loss of revenue for the merged institution. A final legal 
hurdle to the merger was presented when nursing students at 
Barrington College filed a lawsuit against the college charging that they 
were denied the right to finish their education in Rhode Island. 
98 
The merged institution would not offer a nursing program. This 
lawsuit delayed the signing of the merger agreement until the merged 
institution could receive assurances that the insurance carrier for 
Barrington College would assume any financial obligation resulting 
from the suit. 
Unusual legal issues can also arise from how assets are sold 
and the use of the proceeds. In the Westem/Miami merger, 
attorneys for each institution clashed over the procedure to be 
used to sell Western's property. The Western attorney maintained 
that a court opinion was necessary before the property could be 
sold. Both institutions eventually worked out an agreement that 
did not require court action. The courts, however, were used to 
rule on the legality of Western to use residual assets for faculty 
severance pay and to release its trustees from their obligation to 
replace endowment funds used for operating expenses. A final 
entanglement involved a charter stipulation that if the college were to 
close, assets would belong to the founding missionary sect. The court 
had to be satisfied that the sect no longer existed and had no heirs 
before it could authorize Miami as the successor institution [Kennedy, 
1975]. 
Unusual legal issues were not restricted to the mergers of private 
institutions. In the University of Wisconsin system merger, the 
constitutionality of the consolidation was questioned. The central 
constitutional question centered on whether a single board for all the 
universities would be considered part of the University or a separate 
state agency. Interpretations by attorneys general on previous merger 
attempts seriously questioned the constitutionality on the grounds that 
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merger would create a separate agency. As a result, the merger bill 
contained a provision which directed the attorney general to seek a 
declaratory judgment on the issue [Carothers, 1974]. 
In order to minimize the complex and time-consuming legal 
procedure inherent in a merger, two separate mergers in this study 
utilized a technique used in the corporate world. Basically, the charters 
of both participating institutions were retained and the members of 
one board of trustees resigned and were replaced by the trustees of 
the other institution. Thus, one set of trustees would be responsible 
for two corporate entities. In the Parsons/New School merger, the 
New School trustees took the place of Parson's trustees. In the 
Detroit/Davenport merger, the Davenport trustees replaced Detroit's 
trustees. 
For the Parsons/New School merger. Levy [1979] points out 
several reasons and advantages for this alternative to the usual 
consolidation. They include the following: protection of New School 
from any potential financial liability arising from Parson's financial 
problems; reduction in length of time to effectuate merger, a critical 
consideration given Parsons' cash flow problems; elimination of any 
jeopardy involving gifts to Parsons; and preservation of separate 
faculties. Levy concludes that this type of affiliation is a simple, less 
costly technique which has almost all of the advantages of a regular 
merger while eliminating most of its disadvantages. Although he 
concludes that he has not identified any negative effects of this 
approach, there is the likelihood that the legal protection it affords 
will probably fade as time passes. 
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The Process and Organizational Change 
The findings presented in this chapter indicate that a merger 
is a complex series of actions that moves along a continuum from 
initiation to implementation. The findings also indicate that several 
factors--the dominance of one of the partners, conflict resulting from 
competing demands, organizational structure, type of leadership and 
legal considerations--all significantly influenced and shaped the 
process and the relationship between the merging institutions. 
Each of the institutions in this study can be described as an 
organization made up of coalitions composed of a number of 
individuals and interest groups. Boards of trustees, administrators, 
faculty organizations, departments, student body, support staff and 
alumni associations, all qualify as groups which make up an institution 
of higher education. Professional associations, community groups, 
church organizations, government officials and boards are other groups 
that interact with the institution. In the merger process, these various 
groups aligned themselves in various coalitions to advance their 
particular interests. Although there existed a variety of combinations 
of groups in the mergers studied, the common denominator was that 
various groups banded together on the basis of self-interest to 
either promote or stop a merger. 
The findings indicated that various individuals and groups 
differed in their values, preferences, beliefs, information and 
perceptions of the merger reality. One group valued tradition and 
mission, another valued land and expansion. One preferred 
absorption, another preferred cooperation. One believed in a 
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marriage of equals, the other acquisition. One practiced secrecy, 
another consultation. One perceived salvation, another doom. 
Coalitions with different agendas were present in each of the mergers. 
In some instances, these differences were adjudicated by legal action. 
Decisions in the mergers were reached through bargaining and 
negotiation. Who got what was a critical question throughout the 
process. What programs, faculty, staff and students would be 
transferred were frequently debated. What the name of the merged 
institution would be was a major negotiating item for some. Working 
conditions were renegotiated in many of the mergers. Financial 
arrangements were the major bargaining point for some. In all cases, 
legislation and legal documents setting forth the outcome of bargaining 
and negotiations were signed to consummate the mergers. 
Because of differences between and among groups, power and 
conflict characterized the merger process. The presence of coalitions 
with differing views motivated by self-interest fueled conflict. 
Secrecy and the lack of adequate planning also contributed to the 
degree of conflict. The emergence of one institution as the dominant 
entity in each of the mergers is an indication of the role of power in 
the process. The dominance factor also supports the political 
perspective that in organizational change there are winners and losers. 
This argument is reinforced by Schein's [1985] proposition that 
organizational change is a revolutionary process when it results 
in a loss of power on the part of one coalition. To the less dominant or 
acquired institutions in this study, the change brought about by the 
merger process can certainly be described as revolutionary. 
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The process of merger, however, is not entirely explained by the 
political perspective. The drastic or revolutionary change visited upon 
the institutions in this study was instituted in a top-down manner, a 
characteristic of the structural perspective of organizations. In each 
instance, individuals or groups at the top of the administrative 
hierarchy initiated the process and made the decision to enter into a 
merger. Leadership was exercised by key individuals at the top- 
trustees, presidents or government officials. Once decisions to merge 
were made by these individuals or groups, they were handed down to 
other groups within the organization to implement. It was at this 
point that coalition formation was most active and conflict intensified. 
Bolman and Deal [1984] stated that within the political 
perspective, top-down decision-making can undermine organizational 
change. Based on a pattern of unsuccessful efforts mounted by chief 
executives, study teams and consultants, they concluded: 
In every case, the mistake is to assume that a combination 
of the right idea (as perceived by the person trying to make a 
change) and legitimate authority is sufficient to produce change. 
That assumption runs afoul of the political agendas and political 
power of the . . . individuals and groups in middle and lower-level 
positions in the organization who can devise a host of creative and 
maddening ways to resist, divert, undermine, or ignore change 
efforts, [p. 140] 
Although the political view is the dominant perspective in 
explaining the merger process, there is also evidence of the 
effectiveness of utilizing strategies based on human resource 
assumptions. In some of the mergers, widespread consultation 
through the utilization of commissions, task forces, committees and 
less formal, decentralized approaches to implement the merger 
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decision is consistent with the human resource view that 
participative management reduces the conflict between the needs 
of the individuals and the needs of the organization to accomplish its 
goal. This approach was demonstrated to be successful in the Oregon 
merger, but less successful in the District of Columbia merger. Perhaps 
the difference can be attributable to the perception of the individuals 
involved in the former case that their ideas and feelings were being 
heard whereas in the latter case, the participants did not feel they 
exerted a strong influence in the decision-making process. 
The involvement of participants in the implementation of the 
merger process may be a case of too little, too late. The process 
utilized in the mergers may not have sufficiently unfroze the members 
of the organizations to embrace the revolutionary change required by 
a merger. In the next chapter, the outcomes of the mergers will be 
examined in this context. 
Summary 
The findings based on an analysis of case studies support the 
conclusion presented in the literature that a merger is a complex 
series of actions involving risk and other factors that affect 
the process. These findings, however, further identify the 
merger process as a continuum from initiation to implementation. 
As the merger moves along this continuum, several factors evolve 
that significantly influence and shape the process and the 
relationship between the merging institutions. 
The most significant of these factors is the emergence of one 
of the partners as the dominant force in the process. This 
dominance crosses over all categories of institutions—private 
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and public. The principal causative factor for the dominance, however, 
is directly related to the type of institution and the reason for entering 
into a merger. In the private sector financial exigency not only 
propelled institutions toward a merger, but also placed them in a 
subordinate position to the financially stronger partner. Reputations 
and political power played a major role in establishing the dominate 
partner in the mergers involving public institutions. The dominance 
factor significantly affected major negotiation issues involving the 
name of merged institutions and the transfer of programs, staff 
and students. 
Competing demands, exacerbated by the dominance factor, 
created conflict as the process evolved. The degree of secrecy 
in the merger of private institutions also contributed to the conflict. 
In these cases, the use of secrecy wras linked to the main reason for 
initiating a merger, financial exigency. In the mergers of public 
institutions, on the other hand, wide-spread consultation was used to 
manage conflict. In these cases, conflict w’as the inevitable result 
stemming from an externally imposed merger. 
Elements of organizational structure, planning and leadership 
also emerged as factors which affected the process. Less formal and 
decentralized organizational structure facilitated change during the 
initiation stages, whereas formal and centralized structure enhanced it 
in the implementation stage. Careful and structured planning was 
absent in most of the mergers. Extremely short implementation time 
frames, resulting from a financial crisis in most instances, contributed 
to this situation. Leadership during the initiation stage was provided 
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by key individuals in a variety of positions—presidents, trustees, 
governors and legislators. 
As the merger process unfolded, both usual and unexpected 
legal issues emerged. The latter category included lawsuits, sale of 
assets and constitutional questions. Two cases presented a different 
merger arrangement that has been used in the corporate world. It 
involved maintaining the charters of both institutions under the 
direction of a single board of trustees in order to avoid the time- 
consuming and complex legal technicalities associated with a 
traditional educational merger. 
Viewed from a political perspective, the merger process is 
explained in terms of coalitions forming around groups with differing 
values, preferences and beliefs which bargain and negotiate over 
issues of power. Under this scenario, conflict arises because of 
differing perceptions, self-interest of groups and scarce resources. 
Although the merger process is basically political, decision¬ 
making at the initiation stage is top-down, a characteristic of the 
structural approach to organizational management. This conflicts with 
the political process and hinders the implementation of change. Wide¬ 
spread consultation, a characteristic of the human resource approach 
to organizations, helped to reduce resistance to change in some of the 
mergers. 
Having explored both the reasons and process associated with the 
mergers presented in the case studies, the outcomes of these mergers 
will be examined in the next chapter. 
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Note 
1 The president of one or both institutions has been identified as 
the key leader in the following mergers: University of the 
District of Columbia [Taylor, 1978], Barrington/Gordon [Winfrey, 
1989], Parson/New School [Levy, 1979], Wichita State University 
[Greider, 1988] and LeMoyne/Owen [Searcy, 1981]. Governors 
played key leadership roles in the mergers creating 
Southeastern Massachusetts University [Zekan, 1990] and the 
University of Wisconsin system [Heim, 1976]. In the 
University of Lowell merger, a major leadership role was played 
by a legislator [Zekan, 1990]. The chairman of the board of 
trustees of Milwaukee-Downer College exercised the major role in 
its merger with Lawrence College [Howard, 1980]. 
CHAPTER 4 
OUTCOMES OF THE MERGERS 
In Chapter 2, it was determined that the private institutions in 
this study decided on a merger in order to avoid closure due to grave 
financial difficulties. By merging with a financially stronger 
institution, these institutions hoped to save some vestige of their 
identity and tradition. In the public sector, the mergers were 
instituted to accommodate public policy initiatives in an effort to 
provide expanded educational opportunity and accountability. In this 
chapter, the mergers will first be examined to determine if these 
institutional objectives were met. It will conclude with an analysis of 
the impact that the mergers had on participants, the causes of the 
impacting factors and the methods utilized to control negative 
outcomes. The chapter will focus on the tension between 
organizational ends and the needs of individuals. 
Institutional Outcomes 
Financial exigency was the major reason why the private 
institutions in this study entered a merger. By merging, they sought to 
avoid bankruptcy and closure while at the same time continue some 
form of their identity and heritage. Were they successful in 
accomplishing these objectives? The answer in each case is yes, but 
with some qualifications. Although all of them avoided bankruptcy 
and total elimination, some were more successful than others in 
perpetuating their identity and heritage. Most of them gained less 
than they originally sought through merger and this contributed to the 
displacement of faculty and students. Certainly the dominance in 
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negotiations of the financially stronger partner, as presented in 
Chapter 3, played a major role in diminishing the original high 
expectations of the financially troubled partner. The following cases 
illustrate both the positive outcomes and the less than expected results 
of these mergers. 
The degree to which the financially weaker institution was able 
to continue its identity ranged from a significant retention of program, 
staff and students in both the Parsons/New School and the New 
College/South Florida mergers to virtually no trace of continuity in the 
Westem/Miami merger. In the Parsons/New School merger. Parsons 
was retained as a fine arts college within New School and only seven 
students withdrew as a result of the merger. Additional income was 
generated by raising tuition, creating an evening division and adding a 
Bachelor of Fine Arts degree program. Enrollment continued to grow 
to the point that nine years after the merger, the president of the 
merged institution considered Parsons a primary asset, a source of 
viability and vitality for New School [Levy, 1979]. As was stated in a 
previous chapter. Levy concluded that Parsons' program was 
financially viable, only its management was poor. This most likely 
played a major role in the high degree of continuity. 
Another institution that was able to retain its program and 
identity to a great extent was New College. In its merger with the 
University of South Florida, it achieved its goal of maintaining the 
integrity of an academic program, which emphasized independent 
study and individualized instruction, by becoming an honors college 
within the University of South Florida. New College also retained most 
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of its faculty and students. The fact that New College merged with i 
public institution, however, did significantly affect its governance and 
operation. There was a loss of institutional autonomy at trustee, 
administrative and faculty levels coupled with the added 
bureaucracy inherent in the public sector. There also was a 
reduction of the role of faculty in establishing education goals, 
policies and procedures. Student mix also changed, with some 
reduction in selectivity. Reed [1978] stated, however, that 
reduced flexibility was a lesser evil than financial collapse. He 
concluded that the "blending of elitist and egalitarian forms 
of educational philosophy appears to be achieving a stability of 
operation” [p. 109]. 
Barrington College and Milwaukee-Downer College are two 
examples of institutions that had to scale for less than they originally 
hoped for as a result of merging with financially stronger partners. 
Both were unable to negotiate a hyphenated named for the merged 
institution in order to continue their identitv. Both the mergers, 
however, resulted in stronger succeeding institutions. Winfrey [1989] 
reported that the successor institution in the Barrington Gordon 
merger attained financial stability*, strengthened its recruitment 
position, enhanced its reputation and broadened its national visibility. 
In his study of the Downer/Lawrence merger. Howard [1980] 
concluded that 16 years after the merger, the overall correctness of 
the decision was upheld. Lawrence gained by the infusion of funds 
from the sale of Downer’s property’ and the transfer of its endowment. 
Downer was able to continue its name as a college within Laurence. 
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The merger that resulted in the most striking loss of continuity 
for the financially weaker partner was the one between Western and 
Miami of Ohio. Western originally entered the merger to avoid 
bankruptcy and expected to continue its program as a college within 
Miami. The president of Western believed that the "preservation of 
continuity is preferable to demise even if some autonomy is lost in 
process" [Kennedy, 1975, p. 74]. Through the dominance of the process 
by Miami as elaborated in Chapter 3, Western suffered, according to 
Kennedy, a complete loss of identity in terms of its heritage and the 
continuation of its faculty, students and staff. 
Why did the above institutions, all of whom were facing 
financial exigency, encounter varying degrees of difficulty in 
trying to perpetuate their identity? Kennedy's analysis 
[1975] based on a comparison to a business model may help 
answer this question. He posits that if the weaker partner is 
considered the seller and the stronger partner is the buyer, then 
certain conclusions follow. The buyer seeks to obtain the desirable 
assets of the seller at the lowest possible cost. Because the seller is 
facing financial difficulty, the buyer can dominate the negotiations and 
settle on terms that favor the buyer and frustrate the goals of the 
seller. In the Westem/Miami merger, Kennedy concluded that 
Western bargained from financial weakness and Miami was interested 
in obtaining land and facilities at bargain prices. This conceptual 
framework based on a business perspective can explain not only 
Western's lack of success in continuing its program and identity, but 
that of some of the other financially troubled private institutions 
considered in this study. This finding supports and further defines a 
conclusion in the literature that a merger can result in a loss of 
identity and autonomy and produce profound change for the less 
dominant partner. 
In more political terms, the loss of identity and continuation of 
programs by the financially weaker partner is an example of the 
financially stronger partner marshalling its power to take advantage of 
the situation. In so doing, the stronger partner was able to bring this 
power to bear during negotiations to enforce its demands. The needs 
of the stronger and weaker partners were different and in conflict 
with each other. The outcome was that the self-interest of the 
financially stronger institution won out over the financially weaker 
institution. 
Another explanation of the difficulty in achieving continuity 
can be drawn from Schien's [1985] theory on organizations. He 
maintained that when an organization can't grow because of a 
saturated market or an obsolete product, there are two choices: to 
become adaptive through the transformation of organizational 
culture or to destroy group culture through total reorganization- 
merger, acquisition or bankruptcy. The institutions which had 
difficulty with continuity pursued the paradoxical position of 
opting for merger while still trying to maintain a degree of their group 
culture that contributed to their financial problems. One can only 
speculate that if they had been successful at adapting their 
organizational culture, merger would not have been necessary. 
The institutional outcomes for the merger of public institutions 
considered in this study were positive for the most part. As stated in 
Chapter 2, the prime objectives in merging public institutions were to 
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improve educational opportunity and accountability. The Wisconsin 
system merger illustrates the positive outcomes which can accrue from 
a merger of public institutions. Buchanan [1977] concluded that the 
merger accomplished the major goals specified by the legislature. 
They included an increased diversity of opportunity in programs and 
degrees; cessation of program proliferation by instituting a continuity 
of evaluation and providing necessary resources for viable programs; 
protection of graduate and research programs; preservation of campus 
autonomy and initiative by striking a balance between uniformity and 
differences; and increased faculty time for teaching undergraduates. 
She also concluded that the unified system gained in power rather 
than lost power, which could have resulted from the efforts of 
politicians to impose greater control through centralization. 
In the merger that created the University of Arkansas at Pine 
Bluffs, Neal [1978] found that following the merger, mission and 
programs were expanded and physical facilities and funding were 
improved. This resulted in an increase in enrollment, a more 
diversified student body, and an improvement in the quality of 
faculty. Greider [1988] found similar outcomes for the mergers of 
municipal institutions with their state systems. In the mergers that he 
studied, all three of the former municipal institutions experienced an 
enrollment growth rate greater than their sister institutions in the 
state system. They all continued to have strong ties to their local 
communities and a focus on urban studies. With the influx of state 
funds, each institution benefited from lower tuition and increased 
compensation for faculty. 
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The mergers of Massachusetts institutions studied by Zekan 
[1990] also illustrate the positive outcomes for institutions and 
the citizens which they serve. In the merger that created 
Southeastern Massachusetts University, he found that educational 
opportunity beyond textile and engineering programs was provided 
for citizens of the area. Students also were pleased in so far as the 
merger would lead to an institution with more prestige. The merger 
that created the University of Lowell also resulted in expanded 
programs and opportunities for citizens in its service area. This was 
also true for the merger of Blue Hills and Massasoit Community 
College. Even in the highly controversial Boston State/UMass merger, 
Zekan concluded from a perspective 8 years after the merger, that it 
can be judged as successful in the attainment of its goals. The merger 
resulted in a quality baccalaureate education in the City of Boston with 
no program redundancy. 
The results of the mergers of public institutions were not 
completely positive. The types of change required to effectuate 
a merger can have a significant impact on the way an institution 
conducts its business. Chief among these change factors is an 
increase in bureaucracy. In the Oregon merger, McMahon [1984] 
found that the consolidation produced a significant increase in 
rules of operation resulting in a proliferation of written policies and 
procedures. When the three municipal institutions became part of 
their state system, Greider [1988] found that each experienced an 
increase of bureaucracy and a loss of autonomy. This change in 
decision-making made it much harder to reach consensus on issues. 
He made the analogy that the municipals found themselves to be new 
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members of an existing family. He concluded, however, that the 
financial gain for these institutions outweighed their loss of autonomy. 
With respect to outcomes, public institutions shared some of 
the same fate as private institutions. Evidence that public 
institutions do not attain all of their merger goals is found in the 
consolidation that created the University of the District of Columbia. 
Some participants criticized the merger as only an administrative 
consolidation [Taylor, 1978]. This could possibly lead to a 
fragmentation that would jeopardize attaining the merger goal of 
eliminating program duplication. In fact, Dillworth [1981] concluded 
that after the merger, the successor institution was still plagued by the 
same problems of program duplication and poor coordination. There is 
also evidence that public institutions may suffer the same negative 
outcome that the private institutions experienced. In the study of the 
merger of two unnamed public institutions. Cannon [1977] found that 
both institutions suffered a loss of institutional identity. This was 
a significant negative outcome for some of the private institutions 
examined in this study. 
Buchanan [1977] in studying the Wisconsin merger concluded 
that no one got quite what was wanted, but no one lost all that 
was feared. Perhaps this resulted from the attitude expressed by 
one chancellor that once the merger bills were passed "we have to 
make it work. My faculty are all pragmatists" [p. 350]. Although 
Buchanan concluded that the merger accomplished its goals, it was not 
a complete success. She found that rivalry still exists and some 
chancellors still undercut the system president with the legislature 
and continue to build separate power bases. The human elements of 
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power and pragmatism certainly played a role in the outcome of this 
merger. It is interesting to note that, as was stated in Chapter 2, these 
same two elements played a role in causing the merger. 
The Wisconsin case serves as a prime example of how 
institutional outcomes are affected by politics. The alignment of 
various groups during the negotiation process brought power to bear 
on the various negotiation issues. The conclusion that no one got 
everything desired nor lost all that was feared demonstrates the 
skillful use of power in reaching compromises. The fact that after the 
merger, as before, some players continue to build coalitions and power 
for the next round of organizational conflict is testimony to the 
political environment of higher education. 
The political perspective maintains that there are winners 
and losers in the conflict brought about by competing demands for 
scarce resources. Organizational theory also posits that there is a 
classic tension between structure and people, between the 
organization and the individual. In this context, Schuman [1978] 
argued that the individual is "divided, manipulated, and finally 
conquered for organizational ends" [p. 82]. Knowing that 
organizations in this study have accomplished most of their 
institutional objectives for a merger, the question must be asked 
and answered—what was the effect on the individuals who make up 
the organizations? 
The Human Element 
Merger participants, namely faculty, staff, trustees, students, 
and government officials, play a significant role in the initiation, 
implementation and outcome of a merger. The reviewed literature 
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indicates that if a merger is to be successful in effectively 
accomplishing its objectives, then the human element must be 
considered. In this section, the way the mergers affect individuals will 
be examined not only in the context of how these effects relate to 
organizational ends, but also how they affect the individual as a 
person. 
Although most of the case studies did not specifically address the 
impact of a merger on participants, evidence of negative effects was 
found in the descriptive material presented in several of the studies. 
Evidence of significant negative impact on faculty was found in Zekan's 
study [1990] of the Boston State/UMass, Boston merger. He found that 
the merger "engendered in those who participated...such a strong 
anger and sense of unfairness that it lingers today, eight years after 
the fact" [p. 48]. Under the merger, UMass, Boston was able to choose 
the Boston State faculty that it wanted. Other state colleges and 
universities also could choose faculty members who were left. More 
than twenty Boston State faculty selected early retirement rather than 
relocate. 
In response to one of the initial merger proposals, a faculty 
leader at Boston State attacked the proposal as mechanistic. He 
claimed faculty, students and staff were treated as movable parts 
in a reorganized factory [Zekan, 1990]. This foreshadowed what 
would eventually happen to the faculty as a result of the final 
merger. Zekan concluded that "the poor treatment of the 
individuals involved...resulted in a merger that deeply effected 
[sic] the lives of many people" [p. 80]. He further stated that 
many faculty members at Boston State believed that the status quo 
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would be maintained and that the college would not close. 
Because of their powerlessness to influence the merger decision, 
Zekan concluded that this gave rise to anger. In addition, many 
careers were altered as a result of the merger. He found that 
eight years after the fact, former Boston State employees were 
spread throughout the system and still carried the anger of their 
treatment with them. It should be noted, however, that despite 
the impact on participants, he judged the merger to be successful 
on the basis that it resulted in a quality baccalaureate education 
without redundancy in the city of Boston. 
Both the Western/Miami and Downer/Lawrence studies also 
presented evidence of hardships for faculty and students. Most 
Western faculty and the vast majority of its students did not transfer 
to Miami [Kennedy, 1975]. This certainly produced hardship and 
anger on their part as there was little help in relocating. Difficulties 
were not limited to the weaker partner according to Kennedy. The 
role of the Western program remnants within Miami continued to 
evoke embittered feelings among Miami faculty and staff. Although 
most Downer faculty and students transferred to Lawrence, the 
announcement of the merger was devastating to them and resulted in 
shocked disbelief [Howard, 1980]. The negative effects did not stop 
there. Howard reported that 18 years after the merger, Lawrence 
trustees initially denied permission for his study because they thought 
that the interviewing of people "ran the serious risk of stirring up old 
antagonisms. Of immediate concern was the possibility that 
aggravated memories might provoke the changing of wills and 
bequests" [p. 8]. Both fears and negative feelings evidently die hard. 
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Even when a merger is consummated with a great deal of 
cooperation or with little change in faculty or student standing, 
anxiety and fear can be present. In the Barrington/Gordon 
merger, which was negotiated with a high degree of mutual trust, 
Winfrey [1989] found that all Barrington constituents went 
through a grieving process. She reported that its alumni was the 
most seriously affected. They felt angry and betrayed and were 
still bitter after the merger. This supports the literature finding that 
participants in a merger suffer the same symptoms of grief, which 
includes anger and depression, they would experience over the loss of 
anything held to be important. In the merger of municipal institutions 
with state systems, which maintained the status of faculty and 
students, Greider [1988] concluded that turmoil and anxiety were also 
present. 
In addition to the obvious anger and anxiety that anyone 
would experience if continued employment were threatened, changes 
in working conditions resulting from a merger also produce a variety 
of fears. In the study of the Wisconsin system merger, Carothers 
[1974] found that the faculty of the University of Wisconsin at 
Madison feared the loss of quality, prestige, academic freedom and 
faculty control. The faculty in the Wisconsin State University system 
feared the deterioration of excellent undergraduate teaching. All these 
working conditions are highly valued by faculty members. The threat 
of losing them would certainly arouse deep anger and anxiety. 
Now that it has been demonstrated that evidence in the case 
studies support the literature's contention that a merger can 
produce anger and anxiety for participants, the question becomes 
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what causes these negative outcomes? The literature review 
indicated two possible explanations. In some mergers, the 
employment of secrecy and the resulting surprise announcements 
can send shock waves through a community. Initial disbelief 
rapidly gives way to anger followed by anxiety concerning future 
status. Downer College and Western College were prime examples 
of this phenomena. A second explanation stems from the widely 
held assumption that colleges are not suppose to fail. In this 
context, merger is viewed as an attack on stability, a cherished 
virtue in higher education. Anger is evoked in defense of alma 
mater and a sense of agony and powerlessness evolves. The Boston 
State/UMass, Boston merger is an example of this scenario. 
A more definitive explanation of what causes the anger and 
anxiety in participants is provided by Turk [1989]. He maintains that 
individuals have a perception of reality that enables them to select 
what to perceive and how to interpret it. This forms a frame of 
reference that allows the individuals to understand what happens in 
their lives and what to expect in the future. The frame of reference 
enables individuals to reduce feelings of uncertainty and maintain a 
sense of control. When a major change such as a merger disrupts the 
frame of reference, the individual is faced with inconsistencies 
between what was expected and what is perceived. This produces 
uncertainty and stress for the individual. 
How individuals react to the uncertainty produced by the 
disruption between expectations and events varies. According to Turk 
[1989], individuals' reactions can be grouped under two categories— 
danger and opportunity. Individuals within what he calls the danger 
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the danger category employ defensive mechanisms to reinforce their 
frame of reference and deny forces of change as long as possible on 
the grounds that it is not needed. They can become hostile, 
argumentative, angry and depressive concerning the organizational 
change because they are not prepared for the disruption of their 
expectations. Individuals in the opportunity category, on the other 
hand, view the disruption as an unpleasant but necessary part of the 
adjustment process. They accept change and its uncertainty as a 
natural part of living and a challenge to conquer. This is in contrast to 
the individuals in the danger category who deny the uncertainty and 
react by blaming and resisting. The high level of ambiguity present in 
a merger situation can exacerbate this type of behavior. 
One case study gives additional insights on not only how a 
merger impacts on faculty and administrators, but also why 
negative feelings are exacerbated by perceptions. Cannon's 
descriptive case study [1977] on the merger of two public institutions, 
labeled Eastern State College and Eastern Technological Institute, 
focused on the interaction of the individual and the organization. It 
probed the subjective perception of participants concerning the 
merger, their psychological reactions in response to their perceptions, 
and the organizational and individual consequences of the merger. 
Data on perceptions and experiences were collected by questionnaires 
administered to participants at both pre-merger and post-merger 
stages. Data on the consequences were drawn from the findings 
obtained from the questionnaire. 
Specifically, the study considered the perceptions of the 
merger by participants and their merger-related experiences 
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dealing with job satisfaction, role tension, merger anxiety and 
merger satisfaction. Job satisfaction was defined as the degree 
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of satisfaction with intrinsic (type of work, autonomy, interpersonal 
relations) and extrinsic (salary, influence, career progression, 
promotion) aspects of work. Role tension was identified as conflicts, 
overload and ambiguities related to the job. Merger anxiety referred 
to conflicting organizational realities and ambiguities generated by the 
merger. Merger satisfaction was defined as being pleased with the 
merger and organizational change. Because of the importance of 
participants in determining the successful outcome of a merger and 
the scant information about this in the merger literature, Cannon's 
findings will be presented in detail. 
With regard to perceptions, a significant change took place 
between pre-merger and post-merger periods for Eastern State 
College participants. They appraised the event as a "marriage of 
equals" at pre-merger and "an acquisition of Eastern State by 
Eastern Tech" at post-merger [Cannon, 1977, p. 153]. Eastern 
State participants also perceived that their institution was held 
in less esteem by employees of Eastern Tech. Changes in job 
satisfaction also occurred between pre- and post-merger periods. 
Greater job dissatisfaction was reported for Eastern State 
than for Eastern Tech. The greatest change took place for Eastern 
State administrators. They reported decreased satisfaction with both 
intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of their work. Cannon [1977] reported 
that the pre-merger perceptions of a marriage of equals raised 
expectations for better working conditions, salary equalization and 
equitable treatment. Post-merger findings, however, indicated that 
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these expectations did not materialize. She offered this as proof that 
Eastern State was the acquired member and played a less dominant 
role. She concluded that "these organizational realities, in and of 
themselves, serve to explain the greater job dissatisfaction 
experienced by Eastern State College respondents" [p. 179]. 
When Cannon [1977] compared role tension of participants to 
their perceptions of merger, she found that being the acquired 
member helped to explain the differences between groups. She found 
that persons in the acquired category experienced a consistently 
higher role tension rating. She concluded that a merger dominated by 
one of the partners "plays a vital role in contributing to the anxieties 
and tensions experience by the participants" [pp. 212-213]. The 
source of this tension usually came from the sister institution or 
colleagues at the sister institution. Pressure from this source created 
job difficulties for persons who were threatened by the merger. 
Anxiety and satisfaction with respect to the merger also changed 
over time for Eastern State respondents. From pre- to post-merger 
periods, they reported increased merger anxiety and decreased 
merger satisfaction. This may have resulted from lowered satisfaction 
with the aspects of work and the changing features of the organization. 
Cannon [1977] concluded that this is "especially true when participants 
feel that they are being acquired by the more dominant institution of 
the merger pair" [p. 228]. 
In addition to institutional affiliation, Cannon [1977] found that 
two other groupings experienced negative impact in the post merger 
stage. Faculty members and administrators who were employed in 
over-lapping positions between the two institutions experienced 
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increased role tension and decreased job satisfaction. Even some 
faculty in non-overlapping positions reported increased merger 
anxiety and dissatisfaction. She attributed this to the possibility that 
they were influenced by institutional changes caused by the merger. 
In addition, administrators experienced more negative impact than 
others faced based on their reports of increased merger anxiety and 
dissatisfaction. Cannon concluded that this resulted from the fact that 
administrative reorganization took the longest period of time to 
accomplish. 
The major finding of Cannon’s study [1977] is that the most 
salient determinant of the effects of the merger on participants was 
their affiliation with either the dominant or subordinate partner. She 
concluded: 
The delay in resolving organizational ambiguities and 
inequities had detrimental effects upon the professional 
staff during the pre- and post-merger process. 
Specifically, perceptions of Eastern State College as 
the "acquired” member of the merger pair and Eastern 
Technological Institute as the "acquirer" resulted in 
different merger experiences. Thus, the consequences of 
merger for the participant are manifested in the 
post-merger reports of job dissatisfaction, merger 
anxiety, role tension and merger dissatisfaction. These 
expectations were more pronounced for Eastern State 
College participants—the acquired members, [p. 241] 
In a later paper, Cannon [1983] further concluded that 
employees view a merger as a major life change that negatively 
affects their behavior. Citing behavioral scientists, she theorizes that 
this results from the perception of participants that the change will 
prevent them from satisfying their own needs. They thus learn to 
associate anxiety, frustration and fear with change. This perceived 
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link will also increase the possibility thai individuals will resist future 
organizational changes. 
There is ample evidence presented here on the tension between 
organizational objectives and the well being of involved individuals. 
Regardless if the negative outcomes resulted from a learned response 
from previous experience, a reaction to a disruption of control, a 
failure of authorities to manage effectively the transition stage of 
change or the failure of groups to form coalitions to affect decisions in 
an effective manner, individuals suffered as the organizations 
accomplished merger objectives. It is possible that Sc hum an s [19~8] 
contention that the individual is divided and conquered for 
organizational ends applies to individuals involved in a merger of 
institutions of higher education. 
Knowing that negative outcomes for individuals stem from a 
merger, are there ways in which these outcomes can be controlled or 
diminished? The literature review indicated that how participants feel 
about merger is affected by their basic belief concerning how things 
should be done. Thus the culture of the organization, that is. 
individual and collective behaviors, beliefs and assumptions of 
participants, must be taken into consideration. It was stated in the 
review that turmoil, confusion and tension of employees can undo the 
most carefully planned financial merger. In order to provide a smooth 
transition in dealing with employee issues, the literature indicates that 
communication mechanisms, transition teams, morale boosting 
activities, counseling and workshops should be utilized. Cannon [19S5] 
also cited the applicability of applied behavioral strategies in coping 
with negative reactions. They included strategic kinds of 
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interorganizational communications and perceptive human resource 
planning. She maintained that in order to "reduce employees' fears, 
combat shock/disbelief, and diffuse anger, management needs to 
recognize merger as a process demanding planned and preventive 
action" [p. 12]. 
Evidence of the utilization of some of these human resource 
strategies to overcome fear and anxiety experienced by 
participants has been identified in four of the case studies. Brown 
[1987], in his study of the Detroit-Davenport merger, reported that it 
takes time for participants to become comfortable and secure within a 
merger situation. He concluded that the natural fear and anxiety 
resulting from a merger can be overcome by face-to-face contact, 
which will increase communication. He further recommends that after 
a merger, management should focus its efforts on decreasing these 
natural tendencies because people can not be expected to work on 
long-range goals when they feel insecure. In the Oregon merger, 
McMahon [1984] found that the use of transition teams to work out 
conflicts with those involved contributed to positive attitudes. 
Kennedy [1975], in studying the problems associated with the 
Western-Miami merger, also concluded that effective communication 
can overcome resistance to integration. Even communication of basic 
information can help. In a survey of participants in the merger that 
created the University of the District of Columbia, Taylor [1978] found 
that over 80% of the respondents were of the opinion that the 
education of constituencies as to the advantages and disadvantages of 
consolidation would have alleviated much anxiety. 
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These four case study findings support the following contention of 
Bolman and Deal [1984]: 
The human resource frame suggests that there are 
fundamental conflicts between individual and organization 
but that those conflicts can be reduced, if not reconciled, 
through greater levels of collaboration and learning, more 
meaningful work, and genuine exercise of participation in 
important decisions, [p. 132] 
Summary 
The mergers examined in this study accomplished their 
institutional objectives. The private institutions were able to avoid 
bankruptcy and total dissolution. They experienced varying degrees 
of difficulty, however, in continuing their heritage and identity and 
attained less in this regard than they originally sought. This 
contributed to a displacement of faculty and students. A possible 
reason for these difficulties was that because of financial exigency, 
these institutions were cast in a subordinate role during negotiations. 
In business terms, they were sellers in a buyer's market. In the 
political perspective, they did not have the power to affect the 
outcome. One notable exception to this pattern occurred when a 
troubled institution was able to negotiate a unique funding 
arrangement with the stronger partner. A second exception occurred 
when the subordinate institution's program became financially viable 
under new management. In both cases, a high degree of continuity 
was achieved. 
For public institutions, the merger goal of meeting public 
policy initiatives to expand educational opportunity was attained. 
Increased bureaucracy and loss of autonomy, however, were evident 
in many of these mergers. Some public institutions also shared in the 
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loss of identity syndrome experienced by the private institutions. The 
use of political power to affect outcomes was significant. 
Although the mergers in this study accomplished their 
institutional objectives, they were attained at a cost to the participants. 
This is a classic example of tension between the organization and the 
individual. Regardless of the type of institutional control or reason for 
entering into a merger, people were affected in negative ways. Anger, 
bitterness, fear and anxiety were documented in many of the studies. 
These negative outcomes may stem from factors other than the basic 
threat of displacement and altered working conditions. The use of 
secrecy, assumptions that colleges are not supposed to fail and reaction 
to the disruption of personal control all could have played a role. One 
significant study found that the conditions of merger affect 
participants' perception of the event and also cause job dissatisfaction, 
role tension, merger anxiety and decreased satisfaction with the 
merger. This is particularly true for members of the less dominant or 
acquired institution. 
The literature and case studies presented several strategies to 
cope with these negative effects. The culture of the organization, 
human dynamics, communication and human resource planning all 
should be considered. Natural fear and anxiety of participants can be 
lessened by involving participants in decisions, educating them as to 
the advantages and disadvantages of a merger and face-to-face 
communication. 
The two previous chapters and this one have presented 
findings on the reasons, process and outcomes of the 20 mergers. 
In the final chapter, these findings will be integrated in order to 
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form conclusions and develop recommendations for individuals 
involved in a merger of institutions of higher education. 
CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although the merger of higher educational institutions occurs on a 
regular basis and is considered an acceptable option to respond to 
change, research on the subject is fragmented. As stated in the 
Introduction, the purpose of this study is to investigate the mergers of 
institutions of higher education in order to develop an integrated 
understanding of this organizational phenomena. Specifically, the 
study identifies and compares the reasons for, the process used in and 
the outcomes of various mergers that have taken place and 
synthesizes these findings with the current literature on the subject. 
The findings are interpreted so that strategies grounded in the data 
can be developed to assist policy makers and other participants in a 
merger situation. 
The findings presented in the previous chapters indicate that the 
lack of understanding of the elements and tensions of the merger 
phenomenon, particularly the dynamics of change, often creates 
implementation problems. Change plays a major role in the three 
basic tensions that characterize the reasons, process and outcomes of 
the mergers. When the reasons for the mergers are analyzed, the 
classic tension between forces for change and the forces to maintain 
the status quo within the organization becomes evident. The merger 
process itself is characterized by the tension of one institution 
becoming dominant thereby exacerbating the impact of change on the 
subordinate institution. The process is also characterized by how 
various groups react to change. As for the outcomes of the mergers. 
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the accomplishing of organizational ends at the expense of the needs of 
individuals in a changing work environment is a defining tension. 
In addition to change and its tensions, other elements that 
constitute the mergers have been identified in the previous chapters. 
They include use of power, decision-making, crisis, conflict, planning 
and implementation factors. How these elements affect the merger 
process and relate to the major tensions are synthesized in the 
conclusions section that follows. Important distinctions are also noted. 
Based on this understanding of the merger phenomenon, 
recommendations on management strategies addressing change are 
formulated to assist policy makers and administrators in making the 
merger process smoother and more effective. 
Conclusions 
In the Review of Literature, it was stated that the problems in a 
merger situation are so idiosyncratic that each merger must be treated 
differently. Based on this study, however, some important 
generalizations concerning common characteristics have emerged. 
This commonality exists in each of the major merger elements: 
change, crisis, use of power, decision-making, conflict, objectives, 
outcomes and management. Although these characteristics do not 
occur in every merger, their frequency presents a pattern which is of 
importance. 
The merger of institutions of higher education involves first and 
foremost significant change brought about by economic, social and 
political factors. For the institutions, the changes include replacing one 
corporate governing body with another, the transformation of identity, 
the addition and deletion of programs, the adoption of new procedures 
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and the expansion of facilities. The resulting merged institutions are 
different than the predecessor institutions. For the individuals 
involved, the mergers create a threat to their sense of control of what 
is happening in their lives, which in turn leads to anger, anxiety and 
bitterness. For some staff, displacement or loss of employment may 
occur. For those employees who remain, the merger can affect job 
satisfaction. 
Although the private and public institutions entered their 
mergers for different reasons, the decision makers in both categories 
were confronted with the classic tension between forces for change 
and forces to maintain the status quo within the organization. For the 
private institutions, this tension manifested itself in the desire to 
maintain traditional mission and programs in the face of shrinking 
resources. For the public institutions, the tension took the form of 
meeting external policy needs versus maintaining existing academic 
interests. The merger of institutions of higher education is an example 
of how various political, social and economic factors change the status 
quo in American higher education. Except for closing, the resulting 
change is probably the most drastic one experienced by the institution 
and the individuals involved. 
A second significant characteristic of the mergers of institutions of 
higher education is that the use of power plays a critical role in the 
process. As the merger process moves along a continuum from 
initiation to implementation, the role of power significantly affects 
actions and outcomes of the mergers. Because of financial resources, 
size, political savvy or reputation, one of the partners emerges as the 
dominant player in the negotiations. In competing to promote 
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institutional self-interest within the context of scarce resources, the 
more powerful partner is in a stronger position to negotiate terms 
favorable to itself and to exacerbate the negative aspects of change for 
the subordinate institution. The less powerful partner loses out on 
attaining all of its original objectives for entering a merger. As a seller 
in a buyer's market, the weaker institution lacks the power to promote 
its self-interest. The participants associated with the less powerful 
institution suffer a greater degree of anxiety and dissatisfaction. If the 
participants had been more aware of the political aspects of change, 
they may have been in a better position to negotiate a more favorable 
outcome for their institution and constituent groups. 
Crisis is the third characteristic that is usually part of the merger 
process. For the private institutions, financial exigency can result from 
poor planning or management in response to changing demographic 
factors. In the public sector, the intervention of external entities 
desiring more opportunity for citizens or control of educational 
organizations introduces a degree of instability over impending change 
in the traditional role of the institution. Employees face the crisis of 
losing their jobs or adjusting to sudden changes in the ways things are 
done. Students also face the crisis of adjusting to a new environment 
or withdrawing. Because of crisis, the institutions and constituent 
groups are placed in a position of reacting to change as opposed to 
managing it. 
The top-down method of making decisions, the fourth 
characteristic prevalent in the mergers, further exacerbates the 
reactionary mode for the institutions and their constituencies. The 
upper levels of the hierarchy in making the decision to merge are 
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usually sufficiently informed on the factors creating the conditions for 
a merger. The rest of the organization, however, is often not 
sufficiently informed or involved to foster an acceptance of the reality 
of merger and its changes. This results in various constituent groups 
developing different perspectives of the merger. The interest of each 
group becomes an overriding concern. The lack of consultation and 
meaningful participation contributes to resistance rather than 
receptiveness on the part of constituent groups. The way the decisions 
are reached and the lack of attention to the dynamics of 
implementation do not unfreeze an entire organization for the drastic 
changes required by a merger. These factors certainly play a 
significant role in forming coalitions, creating conflict, diminishing 
institutional outcomes and causing personal anger and bitterness. A 
different approach, one addressing organizational and human 
dynamics, could greatly reduce the negative outcomes for both the 
institutions and the individuals involved. 
Finally, the story of the mergers in this study is, for the most pan, 
one of poor planning and management. For many of the institutions, 
their original objectives for entering a merger were not completely 
met. For many of the individuals involved, the merger process was a 
traumatic experience. Institutional ends were given more 
consideration than the needs of individuals in a changing 
organizational environment. The lack of sufficient planning and 
effective implementation strategies played a major role in producing 
these negative outcomes. It resulted in institutions resisting change, 
being divided by conflict, reacting to crisis in a hasty, unilateral 
manner and ignoring the needs of the individual. A merger was not 
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viewed as a process, but as an event that ended all too frequently with 
the signing of the merger document. The strong leadership present in 
the initiation stage apparently ended during the implementation stage. 
Although change, conflict and crisis can be good for an organization 
and its constituencies, they must be managed within a planning 
context in order to avoid or lessen their negative impacts and risk. 
This is especially true in a merger situation where the change can be a 
drastic one. The reasons that the institutions poorly managed the 
merger process may stem from their lack of an appropriate planning 
mechanism and administrators adept at using organizational change 
strategies effectively. 
Table 1 presents a summary of the specific conclusions according 
to the prevalent characteristics of the various elements of the merger 
process. 
Table 1 
Merger Conclusions by Process Elements 












Top down and self-centered 
Not anticipated 
Divisiveness 
Organizational ends overriding 
Individual needs neglected 
Non-existent or poorly done 
Limited or no strategies to facilitate 
process 
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The analysis of dissertation case studies provides several 
important distinctions concerning the merger phenomenon. As such, 
the dissertations serve as a valuable research resource. The fact that 
they are not cited in the merger literature indicates an incompleteness 
in that literature. Public policy initiatives in contrast to financial 
exigency were the reasons for the merger of public and private 
institutions respectively. Dominant institutions saw a merger as a 
takeover to effectuate a financial gain at bargain prices. The 
subordinate institution viewed a merger as a marriage with the 
expectation of equal treatment and the avoidance of bankruptcy. 
Analysis of the case studies demonstrated that a merger is a 
process with distinct stages—initiation and implementation. As the 
merger process unfolded, differences also manifested themselves 
according to the type of control of the participating institutions. 
Within the private sector, the decision-making process was usually 
characterized by secrecy. In the public sector, consultation with 
various internal and external groups usually took place. The type of 
risk also differed within each sector. For the private institution, the 
risk for the merged institution centered on remaining financially 
viable while trying to continue some form of identity of the 
predecessor institutions. For the public institution, the risk involved 
loss of control and the possible lowering of standards. With respect to 
the outcomes of the mergers, differences were again present according 
to the type of control. In the private sector, the weaker institutions 
avoided bankruptcy but had limited success in attaining the goal of 
perpetuating their identities and programs. In the public sector. 
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educational opportunity was expanded and accountability increased 
while bureaucracy was increased and autonomy decreased. 
The dissertation case studies also provided this study with data 
on five mergers that were exceptions to conventional wisdom or 
normal patterns. In two cases, financially troubled institutions 
(Barrington/Gordon and Lemoyne/Owen) merged successfully, 
contrary to the advice presented in the literature that two institutions 
in financial difficulty should not enter a merger. In another case, a 
financially troubled private institution (New College) was able to 
maintain a substantial portion of its identity and programs by 
providing a unique funding mechanism after its merger. This 
accomplished what many other financially weak institutions were 
unable to achieve. The fourth and fifth cases (Parsons/New School and 
Detroit/Davenport) provided information on how a merger avoided 
costly delays by utilizing a simple legal maneuver affecting the 
governing board that is frequently employed in the corporate world. 
Based on the enriched understanding of the totality of the merger 
phenomenon embodied in the conclusions of this study, 
recommendations can now be formulated to guide policy makers, 
implementors and participants involved in a merger situation. 
Recommendations 
This study has concluded that the mergers of institutions of 
higher education involve drastic change, dominating use of power, 
conflict, hierarchical decision-making, crisis situations and institutional 
ends accomplished at the expense of individuals. It also concluded 
that the mergers have been poorly planned and managed leading to 
negative results. To assist policy makers and implementors, the 
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recommendations of this study must address poor planning and 
implementation and the other negative aspects listed in Table 1. They 
are intended to help guide decision makers and implementors in their 
thinking and actions in coping with change in a merger situation. 
They are not intended to serve as a step-by-step recipe for rigid 
implementation. Some recommendations may not apply to every 
situation. All of them, however, offer strategies that could facilitate 
the merger process for both the institution and the individual if 
utilized in the appropriate case. 
The application of management strategies should facilitate the 
changes required by a merger, thereby avoiding the negative 
outcomes so frequently experienced in past mergers. One 
management strategy adapted from the work of Bolman and Deal 
[1984], can be particularly helpful in managing change. They 
recommend that managers utilize strategies in an integrated manner 
from four frames—structural, human resources, political and 
symbolic—to deal with various situations in order to understand and 
manage organizations. 
The structural frame, which is concerned with formal roles and 
relationships, is appropriate to promote goal direction, structural 
clarity and task accomplishment. The human resource frame, which 
attempts to tailor organizations to people, is used to respond 
effectively to human needs. The political frame, which addresses the 
issues of power and influence among individuals and groups, is used to 
deal with coalitions, conflicts and problems of resource allocation. The 
symbolic frame, which holds that ritual and culture propel the 
organization, is appropriate for considering aspects involving shared 
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values, symbols and cohesion. For Bolman and Deal [1984], each frame 
has its own view and interpretation of reality. They maintain that 
successful managers blend the four frames and use them in such a 
way that they are mutually supporting. Table 2 summarizes the 
various frames. 
Table 2 
Summary of Organizational Frames [Bolman and Deal, 1984] 
Frame Emphasis Organizational Domain 
Structural Formal roles 
and relationships 
Goal direction and 
task accomplishment 
Human Resource Tailor organization 
to people 
Human needs 
Political Power and influence Coalitions, conflicts 
and resources 
Symbolic Ritual and culture Shared values 
symbols and 
cohesion 
In a merger situation, administrators must facilitate change and 
must be able to recognize and accept the existence of multiple 
perspectives. A merger will be interpreted in a number of different 
ways by various individuals and groups involved in the process. By 
accepting this assumption, administrators will be able to understand 
better how people will react and will be able to utilize strategies 
drawn from the appropriate frame to facilitate change. For example, 
during the initiation stage of the merger process, the involvement of 
constituent groups in the decision-making process (sharing of power in 
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the political frame) could be used to discuss the feasibility of the 
merger and other alternatives. This could be accomplished through 
the use of decentralized and less formal meetings (structural frame) 
that are of an ad hoc nature. This would provide a forum to facilitate 
the discussion of human needs and concerns (human resources frame) 
associated with drastic change. For some participants, this will 
represent a ritual (symbolic frame) to signal responsibility and to 
provide an opportunity to negotiate meaning. 
By utilizing strategies from the four frames, the decision-making 
process will be viewed by participants according to their particular 
frame: as a rational sequence to produce "right" decisions leading to a 
realignment of responsibilities in the new environment (structural); as 
an open process to produce commitment based on a balance between 
human needs and formal roles (human resource); as an opportunity to 
gain or exercise power involving new coalitions (political); or as a 
ritual to provide comfort and support until the merger occurs by 
maintaining an image of accountability and responsiveness (symbolic). 
Having participated in the decision, individuals and groups should be 
more receptive to change in that they view the reorganization as 
satisfying their particular perspective of what should or is happening. 
During the implementation stage, the involvement of participants 
in the process through the utilization of strategies based on the four 
frames should continue. Formal committees should be utilized to 
transmit facts and information to make decisions on implementation 
issues (structural) and to provide a vehicle for influencing others and 
gaining support for a group's particular self-interest (political). 
Informal sessions should also be provided to enable participants to 
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exchange information and share feelings (human resource) and to 
facilitate the transformation of the organizational culture (symbolic). 
These strategies should help to manage conflict in that participants 
will view the process as resolving conflict according to their particular 
perspective: by formal authority (structural); by developing 
relationships resulting from individuals confronting conflict (human 
resources); by developing power through bargaining (political); or by 
using conflict to negotiate meaning (symbolic). Table 3 on the next 
page summarizes these perceptions according to the four frames and 
organizational processes. 
The skillful use of the integrated frame strategies could create an 
organizational culture that would be more open to and accommodating 
of change. If the basic beliefs, norms and values as well as practices 
and behaviors of the individuals in the organization are examined and 
attended to by these strategies, then resistance to change could be 
greatly diminished. If an institution can create an organizational 
culture that is accepting of change, then it would be continually 
involved in self-renewal which may help the organization avoid many 
of the negative conditions that force institutions into a merger. At the 
very least, it could facilitate the changes required of the individuals 
and institutions involved in a merger. Of course, this goal of a self- 
renewing institution accepting of change could be attained through the 
application of other management strategies. The integrated frame 
strategy is but one possible approach. The important point is that 
institutions should be guided by a vision and management plan that 
will facilitate acceptance of the vision and its changes and guide the 
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Table 3 
Summary of Perceptions by Frames and Organizational Processes 
[Bolman and Deal, 1984] 
Frame Decisions Reorganization 
Structural Rational sequence to 
reach right decision 
Realign roles 
to fit task 
Human 
Resource 





Political Opportunity to gain 
or exercise power 
Redistribute 
power and form 
new coalitions 
Symbolic Ritual to provide comfort 






Frame Meetings Conflict 
Structural Formal committees to 





Informal sessions to 
exchange information 
and share feelings 
Develop 
relationships 
by confronting it 
Political Formal committees to 











institution through the initiation, implementation and follow-up 
stages. 
There are certainly problems associated with changing the 
organizational culture of an institution of higher education to make it 
more accommodating of change. Cultural change within an 
organization is a lengthy and time consuming process. It cannot be 
accomplished as a quick fix for a crisis. Also, not every member of the 
institution can be or is motivated to be involved in the process to 
change the organization. Under the integrated frame approach, the 
tension between the forces for maintaining the status quo and change 
will still exist. The use of the integrated strategy, however, should 
minimize organizational disruption. It provides the opportunity for 
individuals with different perspectives to present their concerns and 
to work out differences within a context appropriate to their frame of 
reference. 
There are other management strategies that could be utilized to 
help institutions avoid or minimize the problems associated with a 
merger. One such strategy would be to evaluate the current 
management of an institution with the goal of making it more efficient. 
Management strategies utilized in business, such as a customer service 
orientation, total quality management, marketing strategies, 
program/staff reduction and the expanded use of information 
technology could be implemented to streamline operations, cut costs 
and increase productivity. In a merger, the bargaining position is 
enhanced when the participating institutions are more viable. 
Institutions ought to monitor their operation for signs that could 
indicate a future crisis. These signs include a mission that is no longer 
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viable, objectives not being met because of scarce resources, decline in 
in enrollment, financial deficits and lack of dynamic leadership 
[Millett, 1976]. Once identified, steps can be taken to prevent them 
from exploding into a major crisis for the institution. 
Institutions should consider the use of consultants in a merger 
situation to assist with evaluation, plan development, negotiations and 
implementation. Legal counsel should be used to handle the variety of 
legal issues involved and to write the merger agreement document. 
Legal advice can also help to save time and eliminate problems as it 
did in the Parsons merger by implementing an innovative corporate 
strategy involving governing boards. Management consultants can 
bring a fresh perspective to assessing an institution's strengths and 
weaknesses and assist with implementation. It is important to 
remember, however, that consultants should not make policy 
decisions, but advise and assist policy makers and implementors. 
Psychologists and sociologists can also help faculty, staff and students 
to cope with concerns. 
Post merger follow-up studies by administrators ought to be 
conducted to evaluate and monitor what has happened. This will not 
only provide a body of knowledge of what went right and what went 
wrong, but will also enable administrators to monitor the adjustment 
period and identify any problems to be addressed. A merger is a 
process that does not end with the signing of the agreement or on the 
first day of operation of the merged institution. The process continues 
for several years after the effective date of a merger. 
Alternatives to a merger should be given careful consideration. 
The institution should clearly identify what objectives it hopes to 
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accomplish through a merger. Alternatives such as voluntary 
cooperation, consortia, federation and Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
procedures can then be evaluated according to these objectives. Pros 
and cons of each alternative can then be compared and the option that 
best meets the objectives can be selected. 
Finally, the use of strategic planning should be considered as a 
mechanism that will enable institutions to be better prepared for the 
possibility of a merger, to minimize the negative aspects associated 
with one and to implement the recommendations in this study. It 
could also help institutions avoid negative factors that could lead to a 
merger. Strategic planning involves "the ongoing analysis of the 
institutional environment to ascertain what long term changes are 
occurring which may provide opportunities with relation to emerging 
educational needs or demands" [Young, 1981, p. 1]. It enables the 
institution to manage or influence change rather than merely reacting 
to it. This is accomplished by identifying and assessing changing 
external social, political and economic factors that could affect the 
institution and its programs in the long term. Strategic options are 
then developed to enable the institution to respond to them in a 
planned way by changing its goals, objectives, organizations, programs, 
etc. Strategic planning is ongoing and should involve in its formulation 
representatives of various constituent groups. 
A strategic plan for any institution ought to include a merger 
option as a response to certain environmental factors such as changing 
demand, spiraling cost, need for complimentary or diversified 
programs, demographic changes, need for better market position, 
increased need for a stronger lobby for state and federal funds, need 
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to satisfy demands for accountability and control, etc. A merger with 
another institution is certainly one option that enables the institution 
to meet and manage these particular environmental factors. Other 
alternatives (cooperative arrangements, consortium, federation, etc.) 
should also be identified and evaluated as part of the plan. The plan 
should also contain contingency options if the institution starts down 
the merger path but does not find a suitable partner or arrangement. 
Strategic planning also provides a mechanism to implement the 
various management strategies based on the recommended integrated 
frame approach. It enables the institution to involve individuals in a 
variety of ways to identify, discuss and develop responses to a wide 
range of environmental factors. It is done during a non-crisis period 
when the process can be more encompassing and deliberate. The 
option of a merger and all its implications can then be discussed in a 
more open manner using the integrated frame strategies. Of course, 
there still may be a need for some secrecy when representatives of a 
private institution are discussing the possibility of a merger with 
another institution. 
By having a strategic plan in place, the institution is in a position 
to avoid or minimize the divisive conflict and trauma that results with 
no plan or poor management of the merger process. It is also possible 
that a good strategic plan and planning mechanism may enable the 
institutions to avoid circumstances which traditionally have led to 
merger—financial exigency for private institutions and greater 
accountability for public institutions. For the former group, a good 
strategic plan should lessen the chances of an institution plunging into 
a major financial crisis. For the latter group, the fact that a public 
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institution has an effective strategic planning mechanism in place may 
convince public officials external to the institutions that increased 
educational opportunity and accountability are taking place without 
their intervention. Strategic planning is also an ideal mechanism to 
implement the earlier recommendations made relative to evaluating 
the operation of an institution for more efficiency and monitoring for 
signs which may indicate the need for a merger. According to Shirley 
[1988], "strategic planning offers colleges and universities a powerful 
means of shaping their futures in a rapidly changing environment” 
[p. 14]. 
Table 4 presents a summary of the management strategies that 
are being recommended to enhance the merger process. When 
compared to Table 1, it specifies how the recommendations address 
the shortcomings of the mergers studied. 
Table 4 











Managed and facilitated 
Shared with stakeholders 
Consultative and participatory 
Planned response with alternatives 
Resolved through integrated frames 
Address needs of organization and 
participants 
Provide support 
Strategic plan to anticipate and guide 
Integrated frames approach 
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Additional Study 
This study has presented several recommendations for 
institutions to plan for and manage the merger process in a more 
effective and efficient manner. Studies of the application of these 
strategies to an actual merger situation should yield valuable data on 
their appropriateness and effectiveness. Most studies of the merger 
phenomenon take place in a time frame shortly after the merger. 
Longitudinal studies or studies conducted several years after a merger, 
should also be undertaken to gain a perspective on the long term 
impact of the process. 
Very few studies of the merger phenomenon address the outcome 
of mergers, especially the impact that it has on individual participants. 
Because individuals within the organization play a crucial role in the 
implementation of a merger, studies ought to be conducted on how 
they perceive the merger experience and the effects that it had on 
them. 
The dissertation case studies focused on institutions that merged 
because of financial exigency or external public policy initiative. 
Studies should be conducted on the mergers of institutions that take 
place because of non-economic reasons (private sector) and 
institutional driven reasons (public sector). In the latter category, the 
recent merger of the University of Lowell and Southeastern 
Massachusetts University into the University of Massachusetts, which 
was initiated from within the institutions, should provide information 
that can be compared with the findings of this study. 
At the outset of this study, it was noted from limited personal 
experience that the merging of institutions of higher education did not 
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appear to be well planned or implemented. As the study evolved, it 
became apparent that this was the case in most of the mergers 
studied. A lack of a broad understanding by policy makers and 
administrators of the tensions and elements that constitute the merger 
phenomenon contributes to this less than desirable situation. This 
study has indicated that the merger of institutions of higher education 
can be a viable strategy for meeting and adapting to change. To be 
effective in meeting objectives and minimizing negative impacts on 
participants, it must be planned and managed so that change, conflict 
and crisis can produce positive results for both the organization and 
the individual. This study has presented one perspective on 
facilitating that outcome. 
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APPENDIX B 
LIST OF THE MERGERS STUDIED 
1. Arkansas Agricultural, Mechanical and Normal College into 
the University of Arkansas at Pine Buff (1972). 
2. Barrington College and Gordon College (1985). 
3. Blue Hills Technical Institute into Massasoit Community 
College (1985). 
4. Boston State College into the University of Massachusetts at 
Boston (1982). 
5. Bradford Durfee College of Technology and New Bedford 
Institute of Technology into Southeastern Massachusetts 
University (1964). 
6. Detroit College of Business and Davenport College (1985). 
7. District of Columbia, Federal City College and Washington 
Technical Institute into the University of the District of 
Columbia (1974). 
8. Lowell State College and Lowell Technological Institute into 
University of Lowell (1975). 
9. Milwaukee-Downer College and Lawrence College (1964). 
10. New College and University of South Florida (1975). 
11. Oregon State University School of Education with Western 
Oregon State College Division of Education (1982). 
12. Owen College and Lemoyne College (1981). 
13. Parsons School of Design and New School of Social Research 
(1970). 
14. Salisbury State with the University of Maryland Eastern Shore 
(proposed 1976). 
15. University of Louisville into state system (1970). 
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16. University of Omaha into University of Nebraska at Omaha 
(1968). 
17. The University of Wisconsin System (1971). 
18. Western College and Miami (Ohio) University (1974). 
19. Wichita University into Wichita State University (1964). 
20. Two unnamed public colleges (1975). 
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